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" It may be laid down as a primary position, and
the basis of our system, that every citizen who
enjoys the protection of a free government, owes
not only a portion of his property, but even of
his personal services to the defense of it."
[Ref. 1]
Until the late 1960* s, the conscription system rested on
Washington* s statement that tenure in the military was a
service to the country, and that citizens had a duty to the
nation to offer their service if called- The Vietnam War
undermined, at least temporarily, these attitudes. There
were many who believed that the involvement of U.S. troops
was a disservice to the nation. The result was the movement
in 1973 from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force.
The shift from a compulsory to a voluntary system has
necessitated dramatic changes within the armed services. In
the volunteer armed forces, market considerations have grown
in importance. Increasingly, the military has had to face
some of the same questions as other employers:
1. How should manpower be recruited, assigned, promoted
and separated?
2. What pay is necessary to attract and retain the needed
complement of employees?
3. What investment should be made in their training and
development?
These questions were not completely iisregarded in the past,
but they received a lower priority before the Ml Volunteer
Force.
Institutions as large as the U.S. Army do not change
over night. History and tradition can not be ignored.
Established practices that are vital to the system's basic
11

functions and those that are merely custom have had to be
differentiated. Inherently, then, the on-going transition
from a compulsory to a volunteer system involves uncertain-
ties, disagreements, painful adjustments and wrong steps. It
best, the ordeal of changing has been painful for the Army.
However, adaptation and change have only just begun.
The Army is in the midst of a major modernization program
with approximately 200 new systems of all -ypes in some
phase of development. These systeus are to be introduced
over the next ten years (by 1990). Although new weapon
systems are its most visible feature, modernization also
includes the introduction of many other non-materiel
systems, organizational changes and doctrinal modifications
which have a collective impact of even greater significance
on the force.
With new weapon systems and a changing military stra-
tegy, comes realignment and restructuring of the divisions.
A major issue then becomes: how many divisions and of what
type will be necessary to fulfill the Arrays' battlefield
strategy in the future.
This paper addresses itself to a scenario in which the
active Army will grow to 18 divisions by 1990. Its purpose
is to discover if the projected personnel by paygrade
increases accompanying the force requirements can be met.
Such a study is of potential value to policy-makers and
force planners in that it identifies some of the potential
problems and feasibility issues involved with a force
increase.
To accomplish this thesis, a review was made of past and
present data relating to supply and demand issues and poli-
cies as they related to the All-Volunteer Force. In parti-
cular, data relating to attrition, retention and accession
were examined as to their influence upon the past and
present manning of the force.
12

The cost, both financially and operationally, of attri-
tion and low retention rates cannot be minimized when
discussing the All-Volunteer Force. The shortage of experi-
enced personnel, especially at the mid-management level, is
a matter of concern to the Army leaders and to Congress.
Past. Congressional policy in the araas of salary, training
and personnel management dealt the Army some significant
set-backs in the late 197 O's, but Congress has recently
initiated or is planning changes to oorrect them.
Beyond guestions concerning attrition and retention, is
the problem of accessing personnel in the quantity and
quality to maintain the Army and allow for needed growth.
As this thesis will show, the pool of potential enlistees is
shrinking thru 1995 and educational test scores have been
decreasing!
An APL program, designated MANHOD, was utilized in this
thesis to project personnel accession, retention and attri-
tion data to the year 1993 in order to provide predictions
of paygrade shortages or overages in growing to an 18 divi-
sion force. This model allows the prediction of the impacts
of changes in accession, retention, promotion and attrition
on future manpower availability scenarios.
Chapter Two investigates the development of force
requirements and establishes a growth scenario for a 28
division Army Total Force (active and reserve components)
.
From the force requirements is developed an aggregate
enlisted paygrade structure that would be required to
support it.
Chapter Three presents the issues involved with manpower
supply and demand. It includes a discussion of training
issues, quality and the demand implications of increased
technological weaponry upon the force.
13

Chapter Four utilizes the APL program MANMOD to develop
two scenarios involved with meeting the growth requirements
of 18 active duty divisions. Predictions by paygrade are
made using accession, attrition, retention and promotion as
variables in the model.
Finally, in Chapter Five, conclusions are made
concerning the feasibility of, and possible problems in,
manning an 18 division active duty Army force by 1990.
14

II. MANPO WER RE2UIESflENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the Army manpower requirements for 1982
will be established. Then, using 1982 as a base year,
projections will be made concerning Army growth and manning
through 1990.
To accomplish this investigation, the Army is examined
from the standpoint of paygrade (i.e., E-5, E-6...) with the
division used as the major force element.
B. FORCE STRUCTURE
1
- PoilSl and De fense Manpower
"The basic national security objective is to
preserve the United States as a free nation with
its fundamental institutions and values intact.
This involves assuring the physical security of
the United States and maintaining an international
environment in which U.S. interests are protected.
Achieving this objective is dependent upon the
ability to influence international affairs from a
position of recognized strength, to fight when
ne-cessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms
compatible with U.S. national securitv interests.
To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are
essential." [Ref. 2]
The National Security Policy is formulated by the
Executive branch (i.e., the President, National Security
Council, and Secretary of State) . Military strategies are
then developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense using the National Security Policy as a
guide. Force structures based on preferred strategies are
then presented to Congress, which weighs them against the
fiscal and physical capabilities of the nation to obtain an
adequate force structure to meet the perceived threat. This
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Figure 2.1 POLICY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER
2« Mobil izat ion Requirements
The Army»s mobilization needs, as shown in Figure
2.2, are determined from a "worst case" scenario. The scen-
ario envisioned is a conventional war in Europe . between NATO
16

and Warsaw Pact forces. The mobilization fores that would be
required for such a war would consist of the following
manpower pools:
1 . units of active and reserve military forces at full
wartime strength,
2. personnel not assigned to units who are needed to
maintain the forces at wartime strengths plus,









TOTAL REQUIREMENT FOE TEAINED PEOPLE




Note: Individuals are those in transient status,
prisoners and students.
Source: Cabe, L.R., and Donovan, P.,
Mobilization Manpower Issues,
Discussion"? a per pfepafecPTor the
Biennial Conference Section on Military
Studies, International Studies Association,
5-7 November 1981
.
Figure 2.2 COHPOSITION OF MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS
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3 . Mobiliz ation Supply.
To supply this force (see Figure 2.3) in a timely
manner, the Army must train a large number of people during
peacetime and assign them to active and reserve units. There
must also be an obligated and trained manpower pool to fill
the active and reserve units to wartime strength, and, upon
mobilization, to replace casualties until the training
support base has been established. Additionally, there is a
requirement immediately following mobilization to begin the
training of volunteers and inductees to provide additional
trained individuals after about four months. These trained
individuals will be needed to:
1. replace casualties,
2. fill late deploying units to wartime strength,
3. and to expand the force , if necessary.
The issue of casualty estimation is very complex
because of the many estimates that must be made concerning
kill ratios and battlefield scenarios. Likewise, pretrained
manpower requirements are a politically sensitive issue
because of questions as to: (a) Who to count?, (b) How much
is enough? The author felt that both (casualty estimation
and pretrained manpower) issues were beyond the scope of
this thesis, so they will a ot be further discussed.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the require-
ments of the Army's active and reserve components in their
peacetime configurations.
*• Mission and Composition of the U.S. Army,
The peacetime army is composed of active duty Army,
Army National Guard (ARN3), and OS Army Reserve (USAR)























Note: Training output= until 3 + 90 days training
output represents those who were in training
on M-day. After that point, the increased
flow from the training base represents new
volunteers and inductees.
IRR= Individual Ready Reserve




L.R., and Donovan, P.,
lob lizatibn Man power Issues,
.on Paper prepared tor the
Biennial Conference Section. on Military.
T- 1Studies, International Studies Association,
5-7 November 1991.
Pigure 2.3 COMPOSITION OF MOBILIZATION SUPPLY
assigning their forces into mission categories of tactical,
support, or individual accounts. Note the percentages of
the assigned Army forces within each contingent depicted in
Figure 2.4.
The tactical mission includes combat, combat support
and combat service support units. Specifically, those units






























ARNG= Army National Guard
USAR= United States Army Reserve
Source: Department of the Army, Program Objective
Memorandum : FY 83-97, v7~5, sec7~7~T9B2,
Figure 2.4 ABHY MISSION ALLOCATION, BY COMPONENT
armor, signal, military police, etc.). The support mission
includes those agencies who indirectly support the soldier
in the field, (i.e., intelligence, research and development,
schools) . And, lastly, individual accounts include those
personnel who are transients, prisoners , students or trai-
nees. Note in Figure 2.4 that the greatest percentage of
each contingent is tactical.
5 . Ty.£e of Div isions
The Army uses the division size unit as a basic
building block when discussing its tactical force. The Army
presently has established 24 such units (active duty plus
the reserve components). These units can be further divided
into five separate types based on their force authorization









As can be seen in Table I, there are 15 active duty
and 8 ARNG divisions. However, only seven of the 16 active
duty divisions are exclusively manned with active duty
personnel. Nine of them require infusion of either battalion
or brigade size ARNG units to achiave authorized strength
levels. Also notice that the [JSAR is not formed into divi-
sion size elements. In addition to the above mentioned
units, there are 25 separate reserve component brigades, 18


























Note: The four ARNG brigades designated as roundout units
to raise the active duty divisions to authorized
strength levels are included ia the active totals.
Source : Department of the Army, Program Objective Memorandum,




6* £§LX3£§&§ Reguiremen ts
The total manpower reguirements (officers and
enlisted) for active Army, ARNG and the USAR for FY 1982 is
approximately 1,426,000. In aggregate, this number tells
very little about force structure. However, in Table II, the
enlisted force reguirements for 1982 are shown by paygrade.
Notice that most of the enlisted reguirement is concentrated
in the lower grades (E1 - E4) . This is due to the Army's
heirarchical paygrade structure.
T ABLE II
ENLISTED REQUIREMENTS BY PAY3RADE (FY 1982)
(000»s)
PAYGRADE E-1,4 E-5 E-5 E-7 E-8 E-9
PERCENTAGE 56.7% 19.2% 13.4% 7.9% 2.2% 0.6%
PEOPLE_
___
700.4 _237.2 165,5 97.6 27._2 7_.4_
TOTAL 0235.3)
Source: Department of the Army, Program Objective Memorandum,
FY 83 - 87. v. 5, 5 eci 77*55fffrtftSfifvOf
DSf ense,~T982.
Now that the FY 1982 paygrade reguirements have been
established and the current division mix defined, the next
topic of discussion will involve projecting Army manpower





In 1976 , the O.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) began what has now evolved into a major effort to
redesign the army for the 1980's. This effort is called
Division 86. Division 86 focuses on the Arrays 1 heavy divi-
sions (armored and mechanized). Its goal is to develop the
optimal structure for employing the many new hardware
systems entering the inventory over the next decade.
Division 86 has also served as the medium for developing and
institutionalizing a methodology for future force design
endeavors. This approach is now being applied to design a
future light infantry division (Infantry Division 86) and a
conceptual heavy corps (Corps 86). Most recently, TRADOC has
begun a study of organizational structures above the corps
level (Echelons Above Corps (EAC) ) . Collectively, these
force design initiatives are known as Array 86.
2- Projected Division Growth
Offensive land operations continue to depend on the
capability of mechanized forces. However, to meet the
strategic objectives of the nation, a proper mix aust be
established among the types of divisions. The mix should
consider the distinct type of advantages offered by each in
cost, strategic mobility, firepower and survivability so
that future challenges or conflicts aay be met successfully.
So the real question is: Hdw many divisions and of
what type are needed to counter the nation's 'perceived
threat and to meet its strategic goals in the 1980's?
General E.C. Meyer has statel that the Reagan admin-
istration's objectives move the army beyond an objective of
2<* divisions, and beyond a national strategy almost
23

exclusively focused on Europe. He states that an army of 29
divisions of the proper mix would msat the Reagan adminis-
tration's strategic goals [ Ref . 3]. Table III contains the
author* s perception of a 28 division Total Army mix.
TABLE III
THE AUTHOR'S PROJECTED DIVISION MIX
RESERVE
ACTIVE COMPONENT




INFANTRY 2 6 5
MECHANIZED 6 12
TOTAL 75 10
Note: Change refers to divisions added
between 1982 and 1990.
Reserve Component = Army National
Guard/0. S. Army Reserve.
Source : Author.
The Army of the future will be lighter, more versa-
tile and more mobile. As a result of Infantry Division 96 r
it will use highly sophisticated weapon systems and rely on
technology to increase its force capability. Because the
Army is putting a great deal of emphasis on the successes of
the Infantry Division 86 tests (tha High Technology Test
Bed, 9th Infantry Division) , the author felt that growth in
the active army would involve the infantry. However, real-
izing the importance of armor in land warfare, the author
also believes that there should be growth in armor
strength. Table IV shows this projected growth and projects




THE AUTHOR'S PROJECTED DIVISION GROWTH
FY FY














TOTAL 16/8 17/9 18/10
Note: Active Components / ARNG Components.
(Change) refers to incraasas between FY's
Source: Author.
From Table IV, it can be seen that there would be no
anticipated increase in tha number of divisions until FY 86,
at which time there would be an addition of one active duty
infantry division and one £RNG mechanized division . Beyond
1986, there would be slow but continuous growth thru 1990
when two more divisions would be activated. Thase divisions
would include one active duty infantry division and one ARNG
armored division.
While the total number of divisions is incraasing by
only four over the eight yaar period, the existing divisions
would also be undergoing force rastructuring to match the
on-going equipment modernization program.
The divisions should be "grown" slowly to insure
that the army can recruit, train and meet the personnel
requirements of the future organizations, and satisfy
doctrinal and deployment requirements. Modernization will
require many soldiers to ba "grown" from within to produce
the specialists needed. Because of the present budgeting
process, the lead time required to field a properly trained
soldier is from 27 to 40 months (from requirement
25

identification to unit availability) [ Ref • *]. Having
established division mix and aggregate manpower require-
ments, the next step involves determining experience or
pay grade requirements.
3- 2l2J§£^sd P ay grade Requirements
The experience mix is very inportant in an organiza-
tion like the Army, because it is heirarchical (entry level
is usually at the bottom). This issue will be discussed in
Chapter Three. The development of paygrade requirements is
based on the following assumptions by the author:
1
.
the present manning levels and support ratios remain
constant in the type divisions,
2. the present career nix (percentages of the total force
within each paygrade) remains constant, and lastly,
3. the 1982 manpower data base is accurate.
If these assumptions are valid, then the projections of Army
manpower requirements by paygrade in Table V will be valid.
D. SOKMARY
Based on the previously described division mix and
prjected growth, the total Army manpower requirements will
increase from 1.426 million in FY 1982 to 1.614 million in
FY 1990. This equates to an overall growth of 13.2 percent.
However, note, as shown in Figure 2.5, that each component
(active / reserve) grows at a different rate. The signifi-
cant point is that under this scenario the Army will be




PROJECTED ARMY ENLISTED REQUIREMENTS
(OOO's)
FY 1982 1986 1990
PAYGRADE (%)
E1-EU (56.7%] I 700.4 766.1 788.8





165.5 181. 1 186.
a
E7 ( 7.9% l 97.6 106.7 109.9
E8 ( 2.2% I 27.2 29.7 30.6
E9 ( .6% i 7.
a
8. 1 8.3
TOTAL (100.0%) 1,235.3 1,351.1 1,391.1
Note: Yearly data are available in Appendix F.
Source: Department of Defense,
Manpower Requirements ReDort for FY 1982,










































AVERAGE GROWTH, TOTAL = 13.2%
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD = 10.8%
U.S. ARMY RESERVE = 25.2%
ACTIVE DUTY = 10.6%
Department of the Army, Program Objective
Memorandum, 1983-87, y. 5~7 sec. 77
Department ot Defense, 1982.
Figure 2.5 RESERVE COMPONENT GROWTH REQUIREMENTS
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III. MANPOWER SUPPLT AND DEMAND ISSUES
"Manning the total force is the major challenge
the Army faces today". [Bef. 2]
Whether or not the United States could raise its armed
forces by voluntary means has been a controversial issue
since military conscriptioa was abolished in 1973 [Ref. 5 ]•
The ability of the A7F to provide the enlisted manpower
required to meet U.S. defense objectives for the remainder
of this century depends upon essentially three factors:
1. the supply of applicants,
2. the demand for enlisted manpower,
3. the quality standards used in screening the
applicants.
This chapter will discuss these issues as they apply to
the active force only. The reserves share a number of prob-
lems with the active force, but the differences are such
that to describe them would be beyond the scope of this
paper.
Military employment differs from the civilian counter-
part in two important respects: the barriers to entry, and
the barriers to exit. The fact that the military obligates
new entrants for a period of service via the enlistment
contract constitutes a barrier to exit. Conversely, because
the military maintains a "closed" personnel system, in that
it fills its upper ranks almost solely from within, there
are barriers to entry (in the career ranks) . This implies
that there are two separate groups, first term enlistees and
careerists.
Translating this into a simple model of labor supply and
demand directs the analysis to the flow of personnel into
29

the first term enlistment To begin with, the demand for
recruits is a downward sloping function of the cost of
first-term labor, at least in the long run. As first-termers
become more expensive relative to other inputs to the
defense mission, fewer ficst-termers and more of the other
inputs will be demanded. This is shown in Figure 3.1.
In the short run, recruiting objectives (demand) may be
relatively inflexible, since for a given force structure, it
may take time to alter the mix of inputs to the defense
mission. This is shown by line (AA) in Figure 3.1. At equi-
librium, wage (We) is paid, recruiting objectives would be
set at point B and the Army would be able to attract a
sufficient number of volunteers. At any point in time, there
could be factors which would result in recruiting objectives
that are less than equilibrium (as shown by line BB) or more
(as shown by line CC) . To the extent that the recruiting
objectives change substantially, care must be taken to iden-
tify which observed results correspond with supply behavior
and which reflect demand phenomena.
A. MANPOWER SUPPLY ISSUES
1 • General Information
From traditional labor supply theory, it is conve-
nient to categorize those factors that are expected to
influence individuals to seek military employment into
several major groups. These groups are:
1. tangible aspects of military service,
2. dissemination of information to potential recruits,
3. employment and earnings conditions in the civilian
economy,












Note: D demand, S = supply.
We = equilibrium wage.
First Term Military wage refers to the
earnings of a soldier within the first
three years ot a contract.
Source: Rand Note R-1450-ARPA, M ilitary
Manpower and the All- volunteer
Force, ~D"y "1*7 V.LT Cooper,
Figure 3,1 ENLISTMENT SUPPLY AND DEMAND (ARMY)
5. individual tastes for military service.
Of the various tangible aspects of military employ-
ment, the most obvious factor is military pay. Higher levels
of military pay , other things being equal, should induce
more individuals to apply for enlistment. But there are
other important factors as well, such as the length of the
initial enlistment tour, the opportunity to obtain training,
and the enlistment options used to lure potential recruits
into the military. Such enlistment options can and do
include the freedom to specify one or more items (i.e.,
occupational assignment, type of training, assignment loca-
tion, etc.) as a condition for entering the military. As
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the military offers more options to potential recruits, more
individuals will enlist, simply because more will find a
match between their own preferences and what the military
has to offer.
The second factor concerns Army recruiting activity,
which includes recruiters in the field, mailings, adver-
tising, and logistical support for the recruiting establish-
ment. Recruiting may serve merely to inform potential
recruits of the employment opportunities in the military and
it may also serve to persuade some to join. In any case, a
larger or more efficient recruiting effort would be expected
to yield more enlistments. Note that, in general, the
tangible attributes of military employment and the Army's
recruiting efforts can be manipulated through policy
directives, either by the service, DOD or Congress.
The third set of factors pertains -to the employment
and earnings conditions in the civilian labor force. As the
earnings opportunities from civilian employment improve,
other things being equal, fewer individuals would seek mili-
tary employment. Alternatively, with higher unemployment,
more people would try to enlist. Tae state of the economy
cannot be predicted with certainty but with some abatement
in inflation, business and industry would be projected to
create more jobs.
The fourth factor is the population base from which
the military draws new recruits. A larger population base
would be expected to yield more enlistments. The importance
of the population base comes from the well known decline in
the numbers of young men, a decline that is already taking
place.
Figure 3.2 displays the historical and projected
number of males (17-2 1) in each calendar year. The absolute
numbers peaked in 1979,and decline steadily thru 1990 to
32

about the same size as the 1970 base. The target population
will increase again in 19 93, as a result of the second
generation World War II "baby boom".
"For the military, the population decline of the
1980s 1 should be mitigated somewhat by a corres-
ponding increase in the numbers of nigh school
graduates. Thus, for example, while the "17-21 year
old male population is projected to be 11 percent
smaller in 1990 than in 1975, the high school
?raduate, male population is projected to be only
our percent smaller". [Ref. 5]
While the trend in the total number of males is on
the decrease, other trends individually and in combination
compound the projected source pool problem. The total number
of males enrolled in institutions of higher education will
essentially double over the period from 1965-1986, while the
number of 18-21 year old males (U.S.) will increase only 28
percent in the same period. Added to the higher education
enrollments is the phenomenal increase in post secondary
school vocational and technical education. Between 1965 and
1975, the federally aided vocational and industrial programs
tripled. The significance lies in the fact that the majority
of males undertaking vocational and technical training will,
on completion, enter the civilian job market, few of them
having ever been available to military recruiters [Ref. 7].
The last influencing factor concerns the individu-
al's tastes for military employment. The variables included
are job content, working conditions, and the like. Some
individuals prefer the content and structure of military
employment, while others do not. Some of the reasons
include:
1. national sentiment toward military service,
2. national security situation,
3. image of the service, as perceived by potential
recruits and the people who exert influence on them







Source "Human Factors and Aging I: Demography *
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Figure 3.2 POPULATION DECLINE OF 17-21 YEAS OLD BALES
2. Surveys of Enlistment Intent
There are two primary techniques for examining the
roles that the various factors have historically played in
the enlistment decision process: surveys and econometric
models. Each has its own set of advantages and disadvan-
tages, and, thus, they can be viewed as complementary tech-
niques. Surveys of enlistment intent permit the analyst and
policymaker to explore many aspects of the decision process
for which other more objective techniques cannot be used.
For example, surveys provide the opportunity to assess some
of the reasons affecting the taste for military service; an
aspect of the enlistment decision which is difficult to
include in formal econometric models. At the same time,
surveys have a number of well known problems, not the least
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of which, is the disparity between stated intentions and
actual enlistment behavior.
Propensity to enlist has been measured, since 1975,
by the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (TATS). YATS conducts
periodical surveys of nationwide samples of 16-21 year olds
who have not served in the military and who are not beyond
their second year of college.
Respondents are asked how likely they are to serve
in the military over the next few years, on a four point
scale of likelihood: definitely, probably, probably not, and
definitely not. Those answering definitely or probably are
considered to have positive propensity. The others,
including those who do not answer, are considered as members
of the negative propensity group. Table VI shows the trends
for enlistment propensity.
TABLE VI
NATIONAL TRENDS IN ENLISTMENT PROPENSITY
(in percent)
SERVICE

























Source: Market facts. Inc.,
The Public Sector Research Grouo,
Youth Attitude Tracking Study: Fall 1980,
flarcK T9ST7
The YATS shows that about 30 percent of high school
graduates and seniors have a positive military enlistment
propensity. However, as is shown in Table VI, the Army is
the third choice of the four services. It also shows the
Army last in percent share of the oritical market segment
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(the higher quality, AFQT category I-IIIA graduate) . The
YATS also shows that the overwhelming preference of high
quality (AFQT category I-IIIA) youth is to attend college
(73. 4%) [Ref. 8].
"In the volunteer environment, we must rely on the
market mechanism not only to regulate the flow
between private and military sectors, but to
control the flow among the services as well. As
long as present conditions exist, the Army will be
highly under represented in tha much sought after
high school diploma graduate category I-IIIa
market". [Ref. 9]
3. Quality of the Source Pool
"Quality, in the Dapartment of Defense lexicon,
generally refers to those characteristics and
attributes of military personnel that are consid-
ered desirable and that contribute to a more
Eroductive, capable, and bettar motivated force.
ecause of the difficulty in constructing indivi-
dual profiles to derive measures of motivation and
performance and because of tha wide range of
different occupations in tha armed services;
manpower quality is customarily described in the
shorthand terms of standardized test scores and
educational levels". [Ref. 10]
The quality of available youth for military service
is a difficult and emotional subject. The aspect of quality
under discussion here is the overall intelligence level of
the potential source pool. One of the indices of quality
mentioned above can be shown to have had a long, consistent
and significant decline.
a. Scholastic Aptitude
The most clear, consistent and unambiguous
evidence of quality decline comes from the results of apti-
tude testing. Figure 3.3 providas a compilation of the
trends in aptitude test data in this country since early in
the 1950's. With the exception of the Law School Admissions
Test and the National Science subtest of the American
College Test (ACT) , all of the data show about one to two
percent of a standard deviation decline per year since the
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rcid 1960's. Other major trends show that verbal scores have
tended to decrease faster than quantitative scores, and that
scores of females have declined mora rapidly than those of
males, particularly in the verbal domain. Also, overall
aptitude test scores increased from 1944 through 1965, but
decreased consistently through the late 1970's. This decline
continues, although there is some evidence that the rate of
decline has lessened somewhat in the past three years.
Although the declines are clearly related to a changing
population of test takers, the pattern has remained fairly
consistent over breakouts by race, ethnic groups, geograph-
ical areas, age and socio-economic status. Thus, the causes
of the patterns are not clear. The general conclusion is
that there are multiple factors which have led to the
decline [Ref. 11].
b. Scholastic Achievement
Figure 3.4 depicts the 1964-1980 results for ten
achievement test batteries. Data for the batteries have been
grouped, when available, iiito grades 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, and by
subtests that roughly parallel the verbal/quantitative/
composites of the aptitude measures. As might be expected,
long-term trends across achievement areas are not as
consistent as across the aptitude areas.
In general, there is consistent evidence of
achievement test score declines, in all areas tested above
grade four, for the 1960' s through 1970's. Preschool and
first thru third grade children scored higher on all
measures, with fourth grade students fairly constant.
Trends toward lower scholastic achievement are considered to
be real, national in scope, and continuing, although at a
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Figure 3.3 HAHPOWER SOORCE POOL APTITUDE MEASURES
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It is evident that national youth performance on
scholastic aptitude and achievement tests has been in a
state of decline. Assuming comparability of populations, for
current military enlistment eligible youth (17-21) the scope
of the decline, based upon the literature reviewed, would
likely represent a general decrease of approximately two to
three percent of a standard deviation per year since 1970.
"This rate would equate to a decline of about four
or five points for the average military enlisted
accession from 1971 to 1980". [ Ref • 11]
The Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery is
used by the military services to determine eligibility for
enlistment, and qualifications. for assignment to specific
military jobs. Four ASVAB subtests are combined to form the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
,
general measure of
trainability and a primary criterion of enlistment
eligibility.
From FY 1962 through FY 1973, the proportions of
new recruits who scored in the various AFQI categories
remained fairly constant. An increase in AFQT scores
occurred during the period FY 1974 through FY 1976. This
rise in test scores was a function of several factors,
including the end of the Vietnam War and the consequent drop
in the number of accessions required, heightened recruiting
efforts in connection with the end of conscription, and an
increase in military pay and compensation. In FY 1977, the
AFQT scores of recruits dropped sharply. Major factors that
contributed to this decline were an improved national
economy following the recession of 1974-75, a relative
reduction in military pay and benefits, and an error in
calibration of the ASVAB.
In 1981, the Profile of American Youth Study,
sponsored by the DOD and the military services, in coopera-
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Pigure 3.4 HAHPOWER SOURCE POOL ACHIEVEHENT HEASURES
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aptitudes of a nationally representative sampla of youth to
develop current (versus World War II) norms for the DOD
enlistment test, the ASVAB.
A comparison of the military accessions with the
1980 youth population showed the following:
1. In general, FY 1981 accessions of both sexas scored
higher on the AFQT than did their counterparts in tha
profile study population. PY 1981- minority recruits
scored higher than minorities in the youth population,
but this was not the case for white youth;
2- Average AFQT percentile scores were highest for youth
in the New England and West North Central Regions of
the country, and the lowest in the three southern
regions;
3. The average AFQT percentile scores of the 1980 youth
population increased with aga
;
4. The average AFQT scores of males and females wera
quite similar. However, sax differences in the
average test scoras were found on the aptitude compo-
sites. The females scored lower than the males on all
but the administrative tast;
5. The proportion of FY 1981 Army accessions in the
above-average AFQT categories was 14 percentage points
below the comparable proportion in the 1980 youth
population;
6. Approximately the same proportion of Army accessions
and contemporary youth scored in the below-average
categories;
7. The median AFQT score for FY 1981 non-prior service
accessions in the Army was 41 as comparad tothe DOD




c. High School Graduates
The personnel presently in active duty armed
forces have been described as superior to those of the past
in terms of test scores, educational levels, and percentages
of high school graduates. However, the use of high school
education as a measure of quality is becoming less relevant.
As of 1979, all but four states were planning to require
students to pass minimum competency examinations for high
school graduation.
"It has become clear that the granting of a high-
school diploma has become a proforma gesture and
no longer indicates that the graduate can read or
calculate at the twelfth grade level. Neither the
diploma nor good grades can be relied on as
implying competence and motivation." [ Ref . 13]
In a national study, it was found that the
reading grade level (RGL) of the average high school grad-
uate dropped from 10.9 in 1960 to 9.5 in 1972. In the near
future, New York City is expected to require high school
graduates to demonstrate that they can read at the ninth RGL
by passing a standardized test. &s of 1980, California
seniors must meet local standards in reading, and arithmetic
before they can get a diploma [Ref. 13].
High school graduation has been considered an
index of attitude and motivation, as well as a reasonable
academic measure. Obviously, the average high school grad-
uate must still be considered, on average, as being more
competent and more motivated than the nongraduate. However,
high school graduation today means somewhat less than it did
five or ten years ago.
d. Forecasting Accessions
The era of the all volunteer force has generated
great interest in forecasting the supply of enlistments that
would be available under a variety of conditions. Very
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little research had been done in this area during the draft
years, and data available on nondraft motivated volunteers
were limited to a few months of accessions daring the years
1947-48. However, in the late 1960' 3 and early 1970's there
were some attempts by DOD to estimate the cost of an all
volunteer force.
With the advent of the AVF, the chief concern
has been with recruiting the so-called high quality (high
school graduate, mental category I-IIIA) non prior service
male. Recruitment of females, non-high school graduates, and
mental category IV and 7 personnel has not been supply
limited. In general, more people in these groups have volun-
teered for service than service policy would permit
enlisting.
Projections of the supplies of high school grad-
uate, non-prior service, male recruits by service, by mental
group, and by year through 1990 have been made by Richard
Fernandez of the Rand Corporation [Ref. 14]. The Rand
projections are the result of a time series analysis of
aggregate data from each service for the entire United
States for the years 1970-1978. Using regression analysis,
the elasticities of recruit supply to variations in popula-
tion, pay, unemployment, and numbers of recruiters were
calculated, and these elasticities were applied to various
conditions that might exist in the future.
The Rand model attempts to measure the effects
on enlistment of a declining youth population under varying
conditions. The Rand elasticity coefficients produced a
negative correlation when forecasts made using previous
years' data were compared with 1973 data. This led the
analyst to postulate that a structural change not related to
the four variables under study may have occurred which
caused a decline in enlistments in mental category I and II
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recruits. (The end of the GI bill and a reduction in the
number of attractive trailing guarantees in the Army have
been suggested as causes.) To accomodate this unknown vari-
able, Rand made two projections for the upper two mental
categories. Case A assumes that whatever caused the 1978
fluctuation was temporary, and case B assumes that the
change was structural and will not be reversed. The effect
on mental category Ill's was negligible.
Table VII (the ARM* NPS MALE SUPPLY
DETERMINATION MODEL) delineates the results found by the
author using the Rand (Fernandez) Model. The inputs
(elements) were changed as shown in Table VII, to adjust for
the changes (i.e., in military / civilian pay ratio, number
of recruiters and the unemployment rate) that have taken
place since the original study was published (in 1978). Note
the sharp decline in the predicted accessions between 1982
and 1986, and the more gradual decline from 1986 thru 1990.
Other uncertainties raised in the Rand report
have suggested that cross -sectional (as opposed to time
series) analysis would be useful. A oross-sectional analysis
uses data from small subdivisions of the country (i.e.,
states, counties), taken at the same time, and attempts to
develop supply elasticities for the variables under study.
If the subdivisions are properly chosen, there may be signi-
ficant variation among them in unemployment rates, popula-
tion, recruiters and pay scales. This verification would
avoid some of the difficulties associated with time series
analysis. During the decade of the seventies, there was a
very small variation in the population of 17 to 21 year olds
in the O.S. as a whole, and real dollar military pay changes
varied almost exactly with recruiter force size. Because of
this, it is difficult to know which one of two or more vari-




ARM! NPS MALE SUPPLY DETERMINATION MODEL






PREDICTED ARMY NPS MALE ACCESSIONS (in OOO's)
AFQT TEST FY81 FY82 FY86 FY90
2000 1960 1730 1680
39.72 43.15 43. 15 43. 15
50 80 5480 5880 5880
8.9 8.0 6.9 6.7




23.5 27.8 21.7 20.8
15.9 16.9 15.7 15.2
28.1 33.6 26.2 25.0
TOTAL 67.5 78.3 63.6 61.0
Notes: POOL: NPS male civilians aged 17-21.
MP: average first year regular military
compensation for enlistees with less
than two years of service.
CP: average weekly earnings in the total
private economy, seasonally adjusted.
RECRUITERS: number of production recruiters.
UNEMPL. RATE: national unemployment rate.
YOUTH UN. RATE: unemployment rate for males,
aged 16-19, seasonally adjusted.
Source: Rand Model adapted by the Author.
series analysis. By taking small subdivisions, the cross-
sectional analyst can obtain a large enough data base
without using the pre-1973 data that may have introduced
further uncertainty in the Rand time series analysis.
Studies by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)
and Duke University have taken this cross-sectional approach
and obtained results different from those of Rand. The Rand
and CNA projections are not exactly comparable because of
different assumptions about the economy. But the Rand "high
growth" projections are compared in Table VIII with the CNA
"less vigorous" projections as the two most compatible
scenarios in the studies. The cross-sectional study done at
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Duke University also produced results Tiore optimistic than
the Rand projections.
TABLE VIII
CNA AND RAND FORECAST COMPARISONS
(NAVY NPS ENLISTMENTS BY SALE HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES
IN MENTAL GROUPS I-III, ?Y 1983-84)
CNA RAND
FY Forecast/ Difference Forecast/ Difference
1979 50723 3 50723
19 80 54303 + 3580 4S315 -4408
1981 52301 -2002 43913 + 2598
1982 50076 -2225 43995 + 82
1983 48240 -1835 45946 -2049
19 84 46215 -2025 43774 -3172
Notes: (1) In FY 1979 the actual number of NPS
enlistments by male high school diploma
graduates in mental groups I-III was 50723.
Rand uses the Moderate unemployment scenario,
Forecast Difference =»s last years strength
minus this years strength
€
(i.e., 50723 -
54303 = +3580; 1979 - 1930 CNA Forecasts).
Pal
Source: Department of Defense and Navy Personn el Supply
MocTeTsT^PToc* eeSTfirg3Tr Sara ~WSrk 5ft<3| Sit e! TT* L
Arlington, 7a., January 22-23, 198T.
As striking as the projection differences are,
the divergence in the results of the independent studies can
best be illustrated by examining the coefficients of elas-
ticity, from which can be seen very different conclusions,
(see Table IX). The Rand study finds very low supply elas-
ticity with respect to recruiter strength, while the Duke
and CNA studies show this factor to have a very significant
impact. The Rand study finds supply most elastic with
respect to unemployment, but the other studies find low
elasticities with respect to this factor. Elasticity with
respect to pay varies significantly among the studies. The
studies are in agreement concerning two conclusions:
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1. the supply of male NPS high school graduates in mental
categories I-III will decrease during this decade
under all economic conditions examined,
2. the supply decrease will be proportionately greater
for mental groups I and II than for IIIA and III3
under all economic conditions sxamined [Ref. 7],
T ABLE IX
ELASTICITY COMPARISONS OF ACCESSION FORECASTS
(AFQT Test Category I-III A, Male, High School Graduates)
ELEMENTS / RAND CNA DUKE
I5II/IIIA
RMC (pay) .8835/.5447 -1.08 .0254
UNEMPLOYMENT
(youth) .245/-. 0493 .36 .1792
RECRUITERS^ i°_733/.3752 _ .43 L2406
Notes: (1) Rand data are f?r case B only.
(2) Rand data are divided into AFQT categories.
Source
3) Elasticity is the percentage change m supplv
given a one percent change in a supply factor
: Department of Defense and Navy Suppl y Models,
Proceea*Ings""of~a florKsKop Held' aTArlingTon
,
Va., January 22-23, 1981.
None of the afore-mentioned studies accomodate
such variables as youth attitudes, political climate or
educational opportunity. Each of the models has deficien-
cies. They also differ conceptually in what they attempt to
forecast, and their data bases are not compatible with one
another. Perhaps most importantly, analyses using ASVA3
data comparisons over the 1976-1980 time frame suffer from
its misnorming problems. Due to the reasons above, the





Within this section, it has been shown that the
source pool is declining in total numbers and that the mean
aptitude and scholastic test abilities are also decreasing.
The Youth Attitude Tracking Study results show that approxi-
mately 30$ of the sample indicated a propensity to enlist.
However, it also showed the Army to be their third choice.
Of those that are enlisting, the Profile of American Youth
Study show that the Army is getting the lowest AFQT test
quality personnel. The median AFQI score was 41 as compared
to the DOD average of 52 and the Profile Youth sample median
of 51. Forecasts of AFQT test category I-IIIA accessions
show a continuous decrease over the period 1982 through
1990. Enlisting more women and males of less educational
attainment, using labor-saving devices, or substituting
civilians for military jobs, may have to occur in order for
the military to maintain its present quality standards and
size. This may be a result of both a decrease in the quan-
tity and quality of the supply pool and of expected future
competition from industry for the 17-21 year old cohort. In
an effort to attract more of the target group, the Army may
have to offer a more competitive wage, renew its educational
benefits, and enhance its publicity program to improve its
public image.
B. DEMAND ISSUES
1 • General Information
In the absence of a relatively guaranteed supply of
manpower, as provided by the draft, the demand for enlist-
ments has become one of the most crucial aspects of defense
manpower planning and management. The importance of enlist-
ment demand to any assessment of the volunteer force is
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illustrated in Figure 3.1. It shows that, the feasibility of
the volunteer forces involves both the supply of manpower to
the military and annual accession requirements (demand)
.
Initially, the major question that the President's
Commission on the All Volunteer Armed Force (GATES
Commission) had to resolve was: What pay rate would be
required to equate accession supply and demand? Once the
general pay rate was set, as it was with the first-term pay
raise in 1971, the feasibility issue became one of deter-
mining supply and demand in the future. In other words,
whether the AVF presents a viable alternative for sustaining
the U.S. defense commitments depends on whether enlistment
demand is rationally determined, as well as on whether
sufficient supply is forthcoming.
2. Sources of Enlistment Demand
It is common to visw the demand for enlisted acces-
sions as an objective, or goal, in its own right, and this
is correct in the case of the middle manager charged with
recruiting a specified number of new people. Yet, from the
broader viewpoint of overall force management, the demand
for enlisted accessions is but a neans for attaining the
more fundamental objective of force strength goals. In other
words, the flow demand is the vehicle for realizing the
desired stock demand, the demand for enlisted accessions
must be examined in the larger context of force strength
objectives.
The policy question , therefore, centers on deter-
mining the appropriate level of enlistment demand to achieve
force capability objectives. The optimal accession policy
will depend on a variety of factors, including changes in
force strengths, the particular mission objectives, the
value of experience on the job, and the cost of training new
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recruits. Ultimately, a cost-benefit analysis must be used
to judge the desirability of accessing new recruits as
opposed to using alternative sources in order to achieve
force capability objectives.
The following simple model shows that the end
strength (SS) in year (t) is egual to the previous years'
end strength, plus the enlisted accessions (A) occurring
during the year, minus the years losses (L) from the force,
plus any reserve call-ups (RA) , and minus any reserve
deactivations (RD) . *
ES (t) = ES(t-1) *A(t) - L(t) + RA(t) - RD(t).
By rearranging the above equation, the force may
also be viewed in terms of accessions.
A(t) = ES(t) - ES(t-1) L(t) - RA(t) - RD(t)
[Ref. 6].
Enlisted accession goals can be derived from the
change in end strengths, plus whataver losses occur during
the year (including the attrition from that years acces-
sions), plus the net resarve activations (reserve activa-
tions minus reserve deactivations) . In other words,
accession policies are, in large part, driven by policies
concerning to the number of losses from the force.
It should be recog nized that losses from the force
will, other things being equal, vary with force size. In
other words, larger forcas will ia general yield larger
numerical losses. So, viewing tha accessions in terms of
numerical rates, rather than requirements, will normalize
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Figure 3.5 ARHY ACCESSION RATE AND END STRENGTH TRENDS
3. Mo del ing En listment Demand
As discussed earlier, one method of evaluating
service accession policy is to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis on the desired distribution of personnel by length
of service, which, in turn, implies the accession rates
required to support the desired force structure. An alterna-
tive approach is to structure a statistical model of the
demand for enlisted accessions based on past service
accession policies.
Using historical lata from the years 1955 thru 1972,
the Rand Corporation made a study (using regression
analysis) to explain past accession behavior. From the view-
point of the A7F, the results imply that the long-run acces-
sion rates (or equivalently , labor turnover rates) should be
about 18.5 percent for the Army (Ref. 6].
Assuming accession rates vary on a one for one basis
with loss rates, the key to developing a model of accession
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demand is in projecting ths losses from the enlisted ranks.
Given the structure of the military career, it is useful to
separate enlisted losses into two groups, those who are in
their first term and those in the career force (four or more
years of service) . Losses from the first term force can
generally be thought of as those related to attrition during
the first term, and those who do not (or are QOt permitted
to) reenlist. Career losses, on the other hand, consist
primarily of non-reenlistees and retirees.
Because of its magnitude relative to losses, the key
variable for planning purposes is the number of reenlistees
from the first term. This, in turn, is dependent on the size
of the cohort eligible to separate from the military and the
percentage of those who reenlist (i.e., the reup rate). In
general, though, variations in cohort sizes, rather than
reenlistment rates, are likely to be the dominant factor
when predicting loss rates.
4. Career Mix
a. General Information
The closed nature of the military personnel
system means that the military draws its experienced
personnel from within the system. Therefore, to maintain an
adequate stock of experienced personnel, the Army must also
maintain an adequate stock of junior personnel.
Because of the "up-or-out" nature of military
promotion policy and the strong association between promo-
tion opportunities and length of service, promotion policy
has played a key role in determining the experience mix of
the service. The Army has been reluctant to have too many
junior personnel, lest there be a glut of personnel eligible
for promotion to the higher grades (with a corresponding
reduction in promotion opportunities). But they have also
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been reluctant to have too few junior personnel, lest there
be inadequate selection op portunities. Manpower require-
ments should, of course, be the prinary determinants of the
number of junior personnel.
As a result of these concerns, the Army has
devoted considerable effort to the development of management
policies for assuring the "proper" experience mix of the
force. However, because factors suoh as the maintenance of
adequate promotion opportunities for military personnel have
been a point of emphasis, decisions regarding the experience
mix of the force have frequently been based more on
personnel management concerns than upon requirements or cost
issues.
With the advent of the AVF, the issue of the
experience mix assumed a new and somewhat different impor-
tance, although the basic problem remained the same
(choosing the appropriate mix) . The removal of the draft
made the experience mix as much a resource allocation (or
requirements) issue as a personnel management issue. By
underpricing junior personnel, the draft encouraged the Army
to develop and maintain a manpower utilization pattern that
emphasized the use of junior personnel, especially enlisted.
The removal of the draft in 1973 and the concurrent large
A7P pay raises for junior personnel, argue for reexamination
of the experience mix. Therefore, determination of what the
Army enlisted accessions requirements should be requires
consideration of costs and productivities.
b. Cost Issues
The inherent problems of screening large numbers
of personnel, as well as the constraints and pressures of
supply and demand, insure that the mix will be less than
perfect. In practice, experience is used as a proxy measure
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of an individual's potential for ade:juate performance at the
next higher pay grade. In addition, promotion policies are
influenced by fiscal constraints, and by vacancies at the
next higher paygrade. Promotion also serves as an important
retention tool, because it affects expected military pay.
For these reasons, the relationship between paygrade and
ability will vary over time.
The experience level of the force provides a
second measure of quality. It can ba measured several ways:
1. by the average years of service of personnel :n active
duty,
2. by the average years of service of career personnel
(those with more than four years of service) r
3. or as the entire experience distribution of the
fo re e
.
Within limits, one can reasonably expect that
more experienced personnel will be nore productive and have
greater leadership ability than do less experienced
personnel. If there is a large enough supply of potential
enlistees the screening process with each reenlistment point
(and promotion point) can serve to eliminate less productive
personnel from the force.
The paygrade distribution within the Army is
highly correlated with the experience distribution. However,
the experience distribution of the force is somewhat less
subject to the types of policy changes that can obscure the
meaning of paygrade as an indication of ability, at least
over short periods. Paygrade is a discontinuous measure in
that, for example, a soldier can arise in the morning as an
E-U , but retire that evening as an E-5. In contrast, the
soldier has gained only one additional day of experience.
5<*

There is one obvious bat important point to
remember when discussing career mix. Personnel in higher
paygrades and of greater experience are more costly than
personnel in lower paygrades and of lesser experience.
Basic pay rises with both paygrade and tenure, and allow-
ances rise with paygrade (i.e., housing). Retirement costs,
also, are a significant deferred cost of a more career
intensive force. Therefore, a more career intensive force,
with more non-commissioned officers, must be one that
results in lower accession and training costs, and greater
productivity or effectiveness, if it is worth the higher
price.
c. Military Productivity
Productivity in the private sector can be
measured in terms of units produced and sold, and effective-
ness can be assessed by the profit standard. But in peace-
time, military output is vaguely defined and is related to
preparedness, which cannot be accurately measured.
Cooper, in his Rand Corporation sponsored study
entitled, "Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force",
states:
1. the average basic pay for first termers has increased
relative to that of careerists, but that careerist
base pay is more than first-termer base pay in the
absolute sense,
2. careerists are more productive on the job,
3. and lastly, there are non-basic pay personnel costs
that impact more heavily on first termers than
careerists.
In particular, the substantial attrition of
first termers make career personnel more cost effective.
55

That is, the nature of the timing of personnel costs,
productivity on the job, and first-term enlisted attrition
all serve to make career personnel more cost effective; so,
the substitution of careerists for first-termers can
decrease costs and/or increase overall force capability.
The results of another Rand study indicated a
substantial difference between the productivity of experi-
enced personnel and that of very inexperienced first-terra
personnel. For example, the average individual with 18
months of service was estimated to be only one- half as
productive as the average individual with four years of
military service (assuming that six months was spent in
training and transit) . In fact, during the first few months
on the job, individuals are estimated to have negative
productivity, in the sense that the amount of supervisory
time that they require exceeds their own productive contri-
bution. Overall, the Rand estimates show that individuals
during the entirety of their first four .years of military
service are on the average about 55 percent as productive as
the typical serviceman with four years of service, (see
Figure 3.6) [ Ref. 15].
This means that careerists can be substituted
for first-termers on less than a one-for-one basis without
decreasing military capability. For example, the Rand esti-
mates imply that for every 100 individuals with four years
of service that are added to the force, about 180 first-
termers could be removed without reducing the capability of
the force. However, it should be reaembered that this is an
assumption bounded by marginality in that there is a point


























Note: 100 typical four-year serviceman.




Figure 3.6 PRODUCTIVITY OF PIRST TERM ENLISTED PERSONNEL
d. Summary
The reason that accession requirements have
failed to adjust downward is in fact largely a result of the
Army's insistence on maintaining a very junior enlisted
force. Although the issue of enlisted accession demand has
been recognized, demand reduction programs have been most
commonly viewed in terms of such policies as: accessing
larger numbers of women and substituting civilians for mili-
tary billets, thereby reducing the demand for MPS male
accessions. The practical implications of these findings are
substantial. For example, the Gates Commission estimated
that a force of 2.089 million enlisted could be sustained
with an annual enlisted labor turnover rate of 15.8 percent.
If, as Cooper states, the accession demand of 24.1 percent
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experienced during the AVF transition were to prevail, then
the maximum enlisted fores that could be sustained without
the draft would be on the order of 1 . 4 million or less. In
other words, the viability of the AVF may be much more a
function of how well the Army adjusts their demand for
enlisted accessions than of enlistment supply [Ref. 6 ].
5. Sk ill Drain
a. General Information
Retention efforts for the total Army encompass
both attrition management and reenlistment/extension
programs. The primary goal is the achievement and mainte-
nance of an experienced career force in each component,
composed of skilled soldiers in the right numbers, skills,
and grades to meet peacetime and mobilization requirements
[Ref. 16].
b. Attrition
The relationships betweei attrition and readily
available indicators of propensity for attrition have been
extensively studied by all services and the General
Accounting Office. Some of the best predictors found are
level of education, age, mental category and reading grade
level.
The nearly 40 percent attrition (separation of a
soldier prior to completion of a contracted term of service)
of the Army's first All Volunteer cohort represents an
enormous cost. The U.S. Comptroller General has estimated
that attrition from the services between FY 1974 thru 1977
cost $5.2 billion, in terms of direct costs to the services
and veteran's unemployment compensation and benefits
[Ref. 17]. Attrition of service members who are unsuitable
is good, what is bad, is that enlistment standards allowed a
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large number of unsuitable individuals to enlist. High
attrition is costly and requires more recruits than would
otherwise be necessary to sustain a given force size.
Attrition has been shown to be highly correlated
to social adjustment of a n individual. The best single
measure of social adjustment readily available to the Army
is the high school diploma. Although the correlation between
high school attendance and scholastic achievement has
declined over the last 20 years, graduates have been shown
to be more likely to sucessfully complete a contracted term
of service. In fact, a person who did not graduate from
high school is twice as likely, ceterus parabus, than a high
school graduate to leave the military before completing the
first three years of service. Consequently, recruiting
programs have traditionally emphasized efforts to enlist
high school diploma graduates. The percentages by service of
NPS accessions over the last decaie who had high school
diplomas when they entered are shown in Table X.
In FY 1981, the proportion of high school
diploma graduates increased significantly in the Army. The
DOD total of 81 percent represents an all time high in the
educational level of recruits. These results reflect vigo-
rous recruiting efforts, additional recruiting resources
provided by Congress, increased military pay and
compensation, and higher youth unemployment [Ref. 12].
Attrition losses for the 1977 active duty cohort
(those people who entered the Army in same year) are shown
in Table XI. The table lists the data by age, sex and
education.
From Table XI it can be seen that, non-high
school graduate soldiers who entered when they were 17 years
old had the highest attrition rate, and those that entered




HSD GRADUATE NPS ACCESSIONS (FY 1973-1981)
(i.n per cent)






































DOD 66 61 66 69 69 77 73 68 81
Note: Table data include male and female acessions.
HSD = High School Degree Graduates
NPS = Non-Prior Service
DOD = Department of Defense
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Manpower,
Reserve Affairs & Logistics, 1982.
diplomas had substantially lower attrition rates than older
cohorts. Also notice the difference in the attrition rates
between the male and female cohorts. This difference is
expected to increase in the future because the Army began to
access NHSG females in 1980.
Literacy levels have also been shown to be
highly correlated with attrition. For example, a 1976 study
on remedial reading programs in ths Navy, found The reading
grade level (RGL) to be the single best predictor of attri-
tion during recruit training [Ref. 13]. Table XII shows the
attrition of Navy men within RGL categories from June 197U
thru January 1975, at the San Diego Recruit Training Center.
A National Defense University survey of entrance
gualifications for 288 Army Military Occupational
Specialities (MOS) , revealed that only four (1.4{) required
a high school diploma [Ref. 7]. The survey also indicated




ARMY COHORT ATTRITION LOSSES (FY 1977-1980)
by sex, age and education, in percent.
MALE
AGE/ 17 18 19 2D 21 22* TOTA
EDUCATION
7&8 60.0 66.7 71.4 40. 71.4 66.7 68.7
9 58.8 55.7 55.0 54.8 48.5 57.2 55.6
10 50.9 50.0 49.4 49. 4 52.9 50.9 50.6
11 47.5 42.2 41.9 41. 1 45.6 44.8 43.9
12 39.5 34.4 29.5 26. 5 30.2 26.8 33.6
NHS 51.5 46.5 45.8 45.5 48.8 48.5 48.6
GED 52.5 45.9 43.1 44. 1 37.3 41.5 43.9
HS 22.5 22.0 24.7 27.5 28.7 29.4 25.2
SOME COLLEGE 34.6 27.5 18.8 21. 23.1 25.2 25.3
COLLEGE 20.0 15.4 36.4 17.6 33.9 29.6 34.3
HS+ 22.6 2 2.1 24.5 26.7 27.8 28.6 25.4
TOTAL 45-0 31.2 31.4 32.7 34.0 34.3 35.2
FEMALE
Age/ 17 18 19 20 21 22* TOTAL
EDOCATION










10 64.7 77.8 66.7 50. 66.7 75.0 70.0
1 1 50.0 42.6 44.9 70.0 33.3 40.0 45.1
12 16.7 51.6 45.5 28.6 33.3 - — 40.8
NHS 52.9 45.5 47.1 52. 6 46.2 50.0 47.8
GED 69.8 62.3 59.1 63.8 63.8 59.8 60.0
HS 40.8 39.5 44.2 43. 44.0 44.0 42.2
SOME COLLEGE 33.3 37.7 38.5 34.7 36.7 39.9 37.4
COLLEGE -— — 20.0 20.0 27.3 30.0 30.4
HS+ 40.7 39.5 43.7 41. 4 42.0 41.5 41. 1
TOTAL 46.7 41.5 45.3 43.3 44.8 43.6 43.2
Note: Table data is for all FY 1977 acessions.
Source: as Department of the Army, DAPE-MBM, 1981.
standards other than HSD and mental category standards are
being applied for specific jobs. So, presuming that only ths
applicants with the requisite qualifications ware accepted,
then it can be contended that the Army enlisted the quality
of person it felt was needsd in those jobs. However, since



















Source: Air War College
Professional study Report No. 6118,
Remedial Reading Programs for Personnel
EnTefTng fHI"*ITnitId~5Ta^es lavy, ~
By~3r"7ier^,"*SpriI T9757
categories, it can be further argued that the lowered test
category trend had little to do with the actual needs, at
least in the MOS's considered, because real training prob-
lems with the guality of enlistmeats are being reported
[Ref. 18].
The Army has re ported the high attrition levels
listed in Table XIV. These data are from some of the Army*s
Military Occupational Skill (MOS) producing schools. It
would seem from the high attrition levels that the Armed
Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was a poor pred-
ictor (for these schools) of school performance (i.e.,
general trainability in the .IDS, unadjusted for variables
such as training methods, course length, motivation, etc.).
The figures also indicate that the SOS gualification stan-
dards applied in practice a ay have also been unsatisfactory.
In another TRADOC survey of an MOS producing
school, the percentage of attrition by category (reasons) was
investigated. The results were:
1. 37 percent of the failures from the 19D MOS producing





MALE NPS ACCESSIONS 3Y AFQT TEST CATEGORY (FY 1952-81)
(IN PERCENT) .
AFQT TEST
CATEGORY/ I II III IV
FY
1952 6.9 20.4 28.7 44.1
1962 5.8 27. 3 44.5 22.4
1972 4.0 28. 4 48.8 18.3
1976 3.2 25. 7 54.5 16.6
1980 1.5 13.7 34.7 50. 1
1981 2.2 21. 4 44.5 30.9
Note: FY's 1976-80 reflect renormed data.
Source: Data for 1952-1975 are from the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Manpower Reserve Affairs & Logistics.
Data for 1976-80 provided by the
Defense Manpower Data Center.
2. another 22 percent were dropped from the rolls for
AtfOL (Away without Official Leave) or desertion,
3. 9 percent were discharged for nedical reasons,
4. 14 percent were discharged for various hardship or
miscellaneous reasons,
5. 15 percent were recycled (not lost, but required
extended training tine),
6. and 3 percent were re trainees from another MOS.
A combined 59 percent of the failuras (TDP and dropped from
the rolls) could possibly be related to motivational reasons
rather than reasons of ability. Iq other words, lack of
motivation may have been the cause of 22 percent of the
total losses from the schools in 1979 (TDP=14^, AWOL=8X)
[Ref. 7],
The Trainee and Expeditious Discharge Programs
were developed by the services to control the extent and/or
63

- ex OXi Ei
ARMY ATTRITION FROM 80S PRODUCING COURSES



























































































Note: (1) The letters st/t/ht relate to the authors technical
categorization of Army MOS*s by AFQT; (st) semi
technical (75-90)
;
(t? technical (91-99) and
( ht) highly technical (100+) . More information
on the procedure is in Appendix B.
!2)
T = technical qualification rating by author.
3) SCHOOL = school attrition.
4) MISC. = miscellaneous attrition.
Source: U.S. Army Soldier Support Center,
National Capital Region,
SttPPortabillt v Asse ssment of the
"Heayy~D"TvTsion HJPTransiTion, "
?7~T7 TSS27
the timing of attrition. These programs are used as
"screening devices" to allow unit commanders to discharge
marginal performers. The numbers of trainees released via
these programs (TDP/EDP) provide an index of the overall
effectiveness of the force. Table XV portrays the trends of
these programs over the last seven years as decreasing.
First-term attrition rates are expected to
decrease from 40 percent to the low 30 g s thru 1983, when
they are predicted to rise again as a result of the high
number of NHSDG accessions in 1980. However, the subsequent




ARMY TRAINEE DISCHARGE PROGRAM RESULTS (EDP/TDP) FY 74-80,





















TOTAL 16177 42764 22186 19855 21798
Source: Prepared statement of LT. GEN. R.G. Yerks,
Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel at a Hearing
of the Senate Armed Services Cobbn 1981.
Percentage of Total Accessions data were
obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center.
graduates accessed in 1981, as well as from the renormed
ASVAB and the introduction of cohesion and stability
initiatives, such as the planned regimental system
[Ref. 14].
c. Retention and Reenlistment
One of the ways the Army achieves its personnel
goals is to pursue a very active and attractive reenlistment
program. The retention of an experianced wcrlc force has the
obvious advantage of saving recruitment and training costs
associated with enlistments. Moreover, reenlistees should be
more productive on the job than a force dominated by more
recent accessions. On the other hand, the retention of a
disproportionate (beyond marginal efficiency) number of
experienced workers means that the average age of the mili-
tary force increases and the costs of salaries and future
retirement benefits rise.
The reenlistment prograa is designed to retain
sufficient highly gualified personnel to meet requirements
for an "over four" (years of service) enlisted force of
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290,000 plus, and a " ~op five" (paygrades, S5-39J content of
274,000 through FY 84. Beyond that point, the career force
and "top five" will increase to aeet the needs of the
expanding force structure, Reenlistment resources, policies,
options and incentives, such as the selective reenlistment
bonus (SRB) , are specifically targeted to encourage reen-
listments in critical skills in order to eliminate shortages
and meet increasing demand for skilled, experienced,
technical personnel to support force modernization
[Ref. 14].
The loss of experienced personnel in the middle
and late 1970' s was one of the most significant manning
problems during that period. The loss of experienced
personnel from the career force is attributed to a drop in
the career reenlistment rate over the last half of the
1970's. The 66.4 percent rate in FY 1979 is generally recog-
nized as the worst career retention year in recent history
(see Table XVI) . However, 1980 retention increased to 69.3
percent, and in 1981 retention was projected to reach 71
percent.
Many models and surveys have been designed in an
effort to find what tastes, preferences and attitudes cause
a soldier to reenlist. \ study with a large data base and
established credibility is the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth Labor Market Experience (NLS) . The results of
analyses of data from the NLS suggest the following
regarding reenlistment propensity:
1. reenlistment intention rates are positively associated
with job satisfaction and inversely related to the
number of months served in the armed forces,
2. reenlistment intention rates are positively related to
educational expectations, but there is no evidence of
an association among male enlistees between propensity





FY/ 1973 1975 1979
SERVICE
Armv 63 % 75.4% 66. '4%
Navy 91. 7% 80.5% 62.4%
Air Force 92.7% 39.6% 81.5%
Harines
_
81 - 75 73.1* 51' 9 1
Source: Department of Defense,
Memorandum for the Members of
the Interagency Working Group,
Assistant secretary of Defense,
Manpower, Reserve Affairs &
Loaistics, 30 December 1981.
3. there was a negative association between the education
of the parent and the reenlistment intention of the
enlistee,
4. married male enlistees report a higher propensity to
reenlist than than never married enlistees, but the
relationship is reversed among females [Ref. 19].
The career reenlistment rate is simply a
weighted average of the reenlistment rate at the second,
third, (etc), terms of service, where the "weights" are the
proportions of the total numbers making a reenlistment deci-
sion that year. Figure 3.7 shows the trends in the retention
rates over time for those making reenlistment decisions,
(i.e., those who are at an expiration of a term of service
point, within various years of service intervals). The
trends reveal a relatively modest decline in second and
third term retention rates from FY 1975 to FY 1979 (years of
service 7-10 and 11-14, respectively). Reenlistment rates
at higher terms of service remained constant, or actually























Note: YOS ~ Years of Service
Source: Department of Defense,
Memorandum for the Members of
the Interagency Working 3roup,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Manpower, Reserve Affairs &
Logistics, 30 December 1981.
Figure 3.7 ARMY ETS RETENTION RATE TREHDS (FY 1975-1981)
However, what did change radically over the
period (1975-81) was the proportion of the career force
making reenlistment decisions at the second and third term
points relative to those making decisions at higher terms of
service. A much larger portion of those making reenlistment
decisions in FY 1975 (and 1971) were in years of service 14
thru 20 than was the case in FY 1979. Similarly, the propor-
tion of the career force making enlistment decisions at the
second and third term reenlistment points in FY 1979 was
greater than the proportion of the career force in the
second and third term, who made ths enlistment decision in
FY 1975 (and 1971) . Hence, the decLine in the career reen-
listment rate over the period was largely the result of
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shifts in the number of personnel making reenlistment
decisions away from years of service 14 thru 20, where
reenlistment rates are naturally high due to the draw of the
retirement system, and toward years of service seven thru
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Source: Department of Defense. Memorandum for
the Members of the Interagency Working
Group, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Manpower, Reserve Affairs 5
Logistics, 30 December 1981.
Figure 3.8 ARMY CAREER FORCE TRENDS
In short, the decline in the experience level of
the career force over the last ten years is only partially
explained by a decline in actual retention rates. Rather, it
is mostly a matter of the dynamics of the enlisted force.
The large cohorts who entered during the Korean War were
followed by some relatively small cohorts as accessions were
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reduced in order to achieve lower strength levels. The
Korean War cohorts represented a large proportion of the
career force, but were concentrated in a small number of
years of service cells. When these cohorts reached retire-
ment eligibility, a large amount of experience was lost in a
relatively short time.
It will take time to restore the experience
distribution of the enlisted force to the desired level.
Improved retention rates can certainly expedite the process,
while a decline would make the process much more difficult.
The experience distribution could be restored to the desired
levels as the cohorts with between five and ten years of
service move into their tenth thru twentieth years of
service. Table XVII shows that the first-term reenlistment
rate is increasing. This trend must continue if the
experience distribution is to get "well" in the future.
TABLE XVII
FIHST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES
(As A Percent of Eligibles)






Source: Department of Defense,
Memorandum for the Members of the
Interagency Working Group,
Assistant secretary of Defense,
Manpower, Reserve affairs 5
Logistics, 30 December 1981.
39 43 51 55
40 37 37 42
20 20 23 27
40 38 36 43
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Career reenlistment rates, and, in particular,
reenlistment rates at tha second and third term of service
rose dramatically in FY 1981, reversing the trend of the
late 1970 ( s. First term reenlistment rates reached
historical proportions in 1981 for each of the services.
The combination of the high first term reenlistment rates
and improved career retention rates suggests that the exper-
ience distribution will improve significantly thru the
1980's. Table XVIII compares the Army's career force
projections for 1987 with the actual FY 1981 career force.
TABLE XVIII
ARMY CAREER FORCE PROJECTIONS (FY 1987)
(ACTUAL) (PROJECTION)
FY 1981 1987
Career (OOO's) 285.3 305.6
Force Size (000's) 674 701
Percent Career 42.3% 43.6%
Source: FY 81 data from DMDC. FY 37 projections are from
the Army. The FY 87 projections are based upon
the OSD Budget Submission for FY 83.
d. Summary
Although aggregate shortages of NCO's in the
Army persisted through the 1970*5, the percentage of
personnel in the "top five" enlisted paygrades remained
relatively stable over the second half of that decade.
Perhaps more serious than the aggregate shortages in the
"top five" paygrades was the loss of personnel in the middle




The experience distribution of the enlisted
force should improve significantly in the 1980's, as
numerically strong cohorts that currently have between five
and twelve years of service move into 13 thru 20 years of
service. The career force, as a percentage of the enlisted
force, should be the largest in recent history by 1987. The
improved experience distribution should increase the effec-
tiveness of the force, but will also increase some of the
costs. In particular, while the number of military personnel
entering retirement will be somewhat lower through most of
the 1980's than was the case in the mid 1970's, this number
will increase in the 1990's.
No extraordinary measures should be required to
improve the experience distribution of the force in the
1980's. Prudent force management coupled with the mainte-
nance of a competitive level of military pay and flexible
use of reenlistment bonuses should result in the reduction
or the elimination of aggregate shortages in the "top five"
pay grades and a more experienced career force.
However, this is not the case for specific
MOS's. Table XIX lists selected first-term and career reten-
tion rates for MOS's which have retention rates (of either
first term or career) of less than 53 percent and which have
manning objectives that are increasing.
6 - Technology' s Imp lic atio ns for A rmj Manpower
a- General Information
a.S. Army force modernization in the 1980's, in
simple terms, means the development and introduction of
nearly 200 new systems. This modernization is considered one
of the major challenges in Army history. In general, force
modernization efforts since World War II have allowed




RETENTION RATES FOR SELECTED AR«Y MOS'S (FY 198 1)
FIRST CAREER
JOB DESCRIPTION M3S TERM(%) {%)
Field Artillery Radar Crewmbr. 17B 30 60
Remote Sensor Specialist 17a 26 67
Tow/Dragon Repair 27E 34 59
Chaparral/Redeye Repair 27g 38 60
Artillery Repairman 45L 31 48
Utility Equipment Repairman 52C 28 47
Power Generator Repairman 52D 26 53
General Const. Eqpmt Operator 62J 80 15
Track Vehicle Mechanic 63Y 42 53
Attack Helicopter Repairman 57y 28 63
Medical Lab Specialist 923 23 48
Electronic Warfare (interpretor) 93
J
11 70
Source: 0*.S. Army Soldier Support Center,
National Capital Region,
v7 T7~19H77
time, have not caused major problems in doctrine, organiza-
tion, or training development. As pointed out by Major
General Richard D. Lawrence,
"This will not be the case in the 1980's. Not only
are 200 systems under development and planned for
introduction into the inventory in less than 10
years. these systems will be introduced in a
peacetime scenario during a Deriod of severely
constrained resources." [Ref. 20]
Between now and 1986, more than forty major
systems will enter the Army inventory. (This does not
include the smaller modifications or add-on systems to the
existing weapon systems.) They include a new main battle
tank, multiple launch rocket systens (MLRS) , infantry and
cavalry fighting vehicles (IF7 and CFV) , communications
systems, electronic warfare/signal intelligence systems,
missle systems, improved antitank systems, fire direction
systems and new transportation vehicles. The complexity of
these and many other highly technical systems will dictate
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major changes and improvements in many facets of the force
structure. New doctrine to utilize the capabilities of the
new weapon systems must be developed. New training programs
will be critical to insure man-machine compatibility, and,
without question, the Army will have to access mental group
I-IIIA quality soldiers ia sufficient numbers to man the
weapons systems of the 1980's.
b. Manpower Quality
Much has been written about the quality of
military accessions. Questions asked include:
1. are they capable of manning the weapon systems,
2. can they perform essential tasks,
3. can they cope with military life,
4. can they exercise lea dership, (etc. )
?
Only by identifying the critical requirements and
quantifying the relationships betwean acceptable levels of
performance and the abilities, aptitudes, and skills, of the
individuals concerned, can these questions be truthfully
answered. In an attempt to answer the questions an Army
research team, at the Industrial War College, looked at MOS
qualifications within the following specific areas:
1. physical capability and capacity,





5. moral standards (demonstrated and potential),
6. socialization (life ooping skills, etc.) [Eef. 7].
From this list the team developed a gradation of
qualifications (low, mid, high) in order to assess the
effects of increasing weapon systems technology on the
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analysis was made to assess the relative iaportance of
currently used qualifications for enlisted military service.











In addition, further judgments were made within
the above areas, (i.e., relative importance of a high school
diploma vs. a general education certificate, etc.) as to
their comparative importance. Using these judgments, a
numerical scoring system was developed which was then used
to obtain gradations levels of low, aid, and high technical
qualification groupings. Examples of some Army Military
Occupational Specialities (MOS) in each group are located in
Appendix A. The profile of the Army by strength in the
entry level MOS's using the numerical scoring system
discussed above is listed in Table XX.
(Note: The author also attempted to analyze the
MOS's by dividing them into semi/technical/highly technical
categories. The divisions are based on AFQT scores and





TECHNOLOGY PROFILE 0? ARMY ENTRY LEVEL MOS'S (FY 1980)
TECHNICAL GROUP POP. PERCENT
High Level 28000 52. %
Mid Level 111000 20. 2 \
_Low Level_
_^
1H22 7U * 6 '
TOTAL 550000 100. \
Note: these figures include only the entry SOS's.
Source: Department of Defense.
Forca Structure Considerations For The
M"Td* :rT98*0'rsT~flanpo wer vs7~T! cJTnoIoc^,
tfaTional He fense~TJniversity7~
Industrial College Of The Armed Forces,
16 July 1980.
c. Force Modernization
The full personnel impact of all the new Army
weapon systems has not yet been identified. So, only those
systems for which reasonably accurate estimates could be
made were sampled. It is felt that the sample represents an
accurate reflection of the trends developing, and that
further analysis of all the systems will only increase the
end points and slopes, but not the direction of the trends.
Table XXI indicates the personnel impacts of the sampled
Army weapon systems on the three levels of MOS
qualification.
The last two entries, Tactical Satellite
Communications and Electronic Warfare/Intelligence, are
actually an aggregation of numerous new systems for which
manpower data exist. Applying the data from Table XXI to the
Army strength profile data listed previously will yield the
manpower growth trends listed in Table XXII.
Table XXII indicates that the trend, influenced








XM-1 Tank (less DS/GS Maint)
XM-2 Inf. Fighting Vehicle - 582 - 202
XM-3 Cav. Fighting Vehicle + 329
DIVAD Gun 355 + 379
ROLAND A. D. Msl. - 417 + 103




+ 48 + 1633 + 193
EW/INTELL (partial) 127 + 429 + 3059
TOTAL - 338 +2773 +3252
Notes 1. Data in the Table are based on 16 divisions
of the current ?FY1 982) nix.
2. Direct/General Support will probably increase
in the low and mid ranges.
3. Savings in the low range are caused by a
reduction in the Infantry Sguad.
4. Savings will occur late in the period only,
because the phase-in of the Patriot on top
of the Hawk missile system will require
the manning of both systems in the interim.
5. Low, mid, high refer to qualification ratinas
made to deternine enlistee requirements for'
entry level MOS 's.
6. + = increases / - = decreases.
7. The basis of this data came from the Basis
of Issue Plans (BOIP) . The BOIP projects the
Organizational placement of a new device
and includes changes in equipment, personnel
that will be necessary to support the item.
Source: Department of Defense,
Force Structure Co n side rations for the
5icT:rT98T7'rsT~~Hanpotf e r vs . TecfTrToTo£v
,
TJationaI~D*efense~tJnTversi£y, TncIusTrial
College of the Armed Forces, 16 July 1980.
migration from the lower level to the higher level speciali-
ties. This migration will probably be of greater magnitude
than indicated when the total manpower cost of modernization
is tallied, and will be concurrent with a declining manpower









High Level 28500 +3252 M1.4*
Mid Level 111000 +2773 2.5*
Low_ Level
^H°_°°_ Z 2 3 § ~_!L 08 i
Note: 1. Entry level occupational specialities only.
2. - increase / - = decrease.
3. Technological category examples are in
Appendix A.
4. Data were developed using 16 divisions of
the current (1982) division lix.
Source: Department of Defense*
Force Structure Co nsiae rat ions for the
Mi3rT9 3'0*T s": !!an£ower vs. Te5KnoIoQy7
Rational Cef ense""Universi€y7"
Industrial College of the Armed Services,
16 July 1980.
d. Training
"The Army has a major man/machine interface
problem. There are not enough qualified people -o
perform the tasks required to effectively operate,
support and maintain current Army systems. .. The
problem is severe and will continue to get
worse-. .The severity of this man/machine crisis
and its impact on force readiness, reconstruction,
and sustamability require that immediate ana
extraordinary action be taken." [ Sef . 21]
Today's Army is being modernized at a pace and
on a scope never before seen in history. The most advanced
technology is going into weapon systems. In the rush to
"beef up" our forces with the best machines that spaceage
technology can deliver, it may well be that not enough
attention has been paid to matching the equipment to the
competencies of the "real world" soldier.
Training is a critical factor, if not "the"
critical factor, in the introduction of advanced weapon-
systems into the Army. General D.A. Starry, former
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Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine
Command, stated it clearly when he said,
"...for as technology advances and battle becomes
more complex, training soldiers and units to cope
with complexity becomes more difficult, and
training is the 'glue' that holds it all
together." [Ref. 22]
The Army is faced with najor training problems,
brought about by an ambitious modernization program and an
apparent reduction in the aptitude of the average new
soldier, as is shown in Table XXIII. Aptitude and func-
tional literacy levels are factors which affect the soldiers
trainability and his retention of that training.
"In WWII, the most advanced American fighter plane
was the P-51 Mustang and it was flown bv a college
graduate pilot. Today, our Army is deploying the
XM-1 tank, a weapon system in many ways more
complex and difficult to operate and maintain
(i.e., it has laser and computer technology) than
the P-51 fighter. Yet, these tanks will be manned
by soldiers who in many cases will not be high
school graduates or able to read on levels any
higher than the seventh grade. Technologically
superior weaponry is useless without personnel who
are able to operate and maintain it." [Ref. 23]
With the complexity of operational eguipment,
there will be a vast increase in the amount of data that it
can handle. With this comes an increase in the responsi-
bility and pressure on the part of the operator to make
decisions that he may be incapable of making. Because of
the very nature of technology, less oomplex eguipment is not
seen in the near future. For example, the mechanic for the
M-1 (Abrams) Tank must go to war with seven suitcases full
of electronic test eguipment [Ref. 17].
Table XXIII shows how the Army NPS accessions
look on the basis of the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT) . Note in particular the decline in scores from FY
1976 thru Fy 1980. A major research effort was recently
concluded that compared FY 1981 recruits with the 1980 youth
population. It concluded that, in geieral, military recruits
during FY 1981 scored higher on the AFQT than did the sample
79

youth. Approximately the same proportion of individuals with
above average scores were found in both the 1980 youth popu-
lation and the group of new accessions. However, the
proportion of accessions scoring in the average range was
considerably higher than the comparable proportion of the
1980 youth sample.
A comparison of APQT scores of the 1980 youth
population and FY 198 1 accessions, by selected demographic
characteristics, showed variations in the representativeness
of the sexes and the racial and ethnic groups. In general,
FY 1981 accessions of both sexes scored higher on the AFQT
than did the 1980 youth population. there was no difference
of consequence between the proportions of male youth and the
reference population. However, AFQT percentile scores for
whites were higher, on the average, than those for Hispanics
or Blacks. Hispanics, in turn, scored higher than Blacks.
This pattern of racial/ethnic group performance was the same
on estimates of reading grade level [ Ref . 12].
In a congressional hearing on March 7, 1979, the
Honorable Robert H. Mitchell of Illinois, stated,
...the U.S. Army is having difficulty finding
recruits who can read..." Mitchell further
stated,".. . All training manuals for lower echelon
troops are to be rewritten foe understanding by
persons reading at the seventh grade level...
Even at that level... About twenty seven percent
of the Army's new enlistees will have trouble
reading them." [Ref. 2U ]
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) found
that enlistees who were poor readers, when compared to the
average enlisted population, tended to have higher discharge
rates, experience more difficulty in training, perform less
satisfactorily on the job, and lack the potential for career
advancement [Ref. 25].
The Human Resources Research Organization
(HumRRO) found literacy skills related to military job










1961 1972 56.3 53.3
1962 57.7 4 9.3 1973 56. 1 53. 1
19 63 59. 1 48.8 1974 58.0 52.5
1964 53.7 50.6 1975 60.7 57.5
1965 57.9 49.5 1976 61.7 48.8
1966 5 8.7 49.6 1977 47.6 32. 1
1967 56.4 48.7 1978 49.2 33.9
1968 54.0 47.1 1979 44. 1 23.4
1969 54.2 48.3 1980 44.6 27.8
1970 53.5 48.2 1981 54.4 39.8
1971 53.7 48. 1
Note: Table data includes all NPS accessions.






as good or better predictors of job knowledge, and in some
cases of job performance, than were \FQT scores. Table XXIV
shows the correlations between predictors and job
proficiency measures as found by HumRRO (Ref. 26].
The Army has tried to cope with the illiteracy
problem by remedial reading programs and by reducing the
difficulty of reading material. HDwever, the results :nay
net justify the costs. To reduce the expense the GAO has
recommended establishing a minimum RGL for enlistment and a
specific RGL for each MOS.
C. SUMMARY
Throughout the history of the U.S., each subsequent
generation has been better educated than were their fathers
and mothers before them. But, the educational level seems

























































Source: Human Resources Research Organization,
HumRRO-TR-71-1, Effects of Altitude JAFDTJ ,
Job Experience, aril rile racy on JoT? performance:
Summary ofTTu mRRO~""7ork Units
TJTTIin and-ilATTsrTTT
, T5y"^J". ^ineEef g,""and others, February 197 1.
as aptitude and scholastic test scores are shown to be
decreasing. Additionally, with the present trend in the
CT.S. towards "Zero Population Growth" (approximately two
children per family) , the pool of youth available for
military service is seriously shrinking [Ref. 27].
The Profile of American Youth Study results showed that
the Army average AFQT score was 14 percentage points under
the 1980 profile youth average in the above average AFQT
categories, and 10 percentage points under the profile
sample in the below average AFQT categories. The real gues-
tion then becomes: What qualifications are required by the
Army of its enlistees?
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The technological trend study indicated -hat the demand
for the high and mid level MOS's will be increasing in
relation to the low leval MOS requirements.
New equipment supports specific doctrinal (how the Army
does business) changes. It has great significance in the way
the force is manned, and in how skill inventories are
planned. Personnel training programs and facilities must
precede weapon introduction and, must exist to sustain
system effectiveness in the field. The Army Chief of Staff
has stated that,
"...what is possible through technical sophistica-
tion can only be borne out by 'training up' to the
weapon complexity... I hops it is clear that
training is one of the two paramount concerns I
have about our units and the necessary focus of
our leaders, (The other is maintenance) ... Our
ability to manage change hinges critically on our
continued competence in training people for the
multitude of tasks required to meet the challenges
that arise in the Army of today and tomorrow."
[Ref. 3]
To meet the soldier/machine interface challenge, the end
results must be solutions which draw the most out of both
soldiers and machines. To accomplish this, equipment designs
must be supportable in teems of manpower, training and the
competencies of the soldiers must be matched to the
equipment requirements.
The Army is faced with the problem of how to assign a
limited number of people t o an almost equal number of jobs
in a manner that will optimize the Army's effectiveness.
The effectiveness of the personnel system is dependent upon
how well its supply and demand characteristics are met. If
the Army is to realize the combat potential of its improved
and future systems it must:
1. Identify the critical occupatiDnal requirements,
2. quantify the relationships between acceptable levels
of performance and the abilities, aptitudes, skills,
(etc.), of the current and projected supply of
experienced NCO's and new recruits,
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3. develop an equally sophisticated personnel system to





In this chapter, several "what if" questions concerning
numbers of recruits, promotion rates and attrition rates are
asked in order to make predictions concerning OS Army
accession and retention by paygrade, for the period of 1982
thru 1990. The tool used to accomplish this is called
"Manmod".
"Manmod" is an interactive computer program based on
Markov Chain theory and written in A.P.L. (Applied
Programing Language) . (The directions for using this
program, as it is available at the Naval Postgraduate
School, are located in Appendix C.)
The data used to make these predictions are taken from
the 1982 base year information (active forces only)
discussed in Chapter II. Several scenarios were developed
by making assumptions concerning the data and translating it
for use as "Manmod" input information. The impact of
predictions concerning required acessions, retention and
force size (by paygrade) is then discussed with regard to
the given scenario.
The following discussion of manpower planning and Markov
Chain theory is offered to help the reader understand the
Manmod outputs and how they were attained.
1 . Manpower Planning
Manpower planning is often defined as the attempt to
match the supply of people with the jobs available for them.
There are two features of most manpower planning problems
which make them suitable for statistical treatment. The
first is the concern for aggregates. Manpower planning is
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concerned with numbers, that is, with having the right
number of people at the right place it the right time. The
individual (single person) and aggregate (groups of 100 or
more) aspects are closely related, and, in practice, cannot
be separated. However, statistical methods are of the most
direct relevance for handling tha aggregate condition,
(i.e., what the average person would do).
The second feature of manpower planning, which calls
for statistical expertise, is the factor of uncertainty.
This arises both from the uncertainty in the social and
economic environment in which the Army operates, and from
the unpredictability of human behavior. Any attempt to
construct a theoretical ba se for manpower planning should,
therefore, reckon with the element of uncertainty by
introducing probability theory [Ref. 28].
2. Man powe r Models
A manpower model is essentially a description of the
personnel system, it is modeling, together with a set of
assumptions about the behavior of the uncontrolled varia-
bles. Such assumptions may be based on two kinds of consid-
erations which may be briefly described as empirical or
hypothetical. An empirical assumption means one devised
from past observation. A simple example is provided by
attrition rates. If records of leaving people have similar
length of service, it is found that the number is approxi-
mately proportional, over time, to the stock of people with
that particular length of service. Since this is consistent
with the assumption that each individual has the same prob-
ability of leaving (not depending on calendar time), the
observation might be incorporated into the model. In other
words, it is assuming that what has happened in the past
will happen in the future [Ref. 29].
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In many planning situations, however, the interest
is in exploring the future and asking "what if," or hypoth-
etical, questions. Professors Bartholomew and Forbes have
written extensively about the potential value of the Markov
Theory approaches in modeling these hypothetical questions.
Forbes discuss* s the Markov approach below.
"...the manpower system is considered to be
composed of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
classes or states so that each member of the
system may be in one and only 02 e class at a given
time... the flows are assumed to be governed bv
transition probabilities and each class is homoge-
neous and independent with respect to these prob-
abilities. .. the basis of the markov assumption is
that the transition probabilities depend only on
the class or state occupied at oresent. . . the equa-
tion is deterministic since it only gives the
expected numbers... If the model is viewed stochas-
tically a similar equation may be derived. .. (there
are problems with homogeneity of
classes) ... promotion in reality depends on vacan-
cies, therefore one flow is dependent on another
higher up. ..this does not necessarily imply,
however, that the model with constant promotion
rates will not give reasonable predictions."
[Ref. 30]
The empirical observation that flows are propor-
tional to stocks is a common one which provides the basis
for the widespread use of so-called Sarkov Chain Models.
3- The Basic Markov Model:
The system is divided into (k) categories or grades.
The transition probabilities between each of the grades may
then be set out in an array as follows:
P (11 ) P(12) P(1k) | »(1J
P(21) P(22) P(2k) | W(2)
m
11 tt 11 11 11 11 I 11 it
m
it ii 11 11 11 »i I 11 11
m
P(k1) P(k2) P(kk) | W(k)
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Where the element P (ij) is the probability that an
individual in grade (i) at the start of the time interval is
in grade (j) at the end; flhils W (i) is the probability that
a member of grade (i) at the start has left by the end of
the interval.
The assumptions for the Markov Chain Model are that
Individuals move independently and with identical probabili-
ties which do not vary ovar time and that individuals must
either stay where they are, move to another grade, or leave,
(the rows sum to one) .
The matrix P = p is called the transition matrix
and the row vector W = w , w , . ...w is called the wastage
(attrition) vector.
The elements of (p) and (w| will be assigned numer-
ical values in all applications by making hypothetical
assumptions about them or by estimating the probabilities
from past data. Recruitment will only be allowed in
paygrades E1-E5 as specified by the recruitment vector
R=r(i) [Ref. 31].
a. Concepts, Terminology and Notation.
The central idea underlying the theory is to
regard the organization as a dynamic system of stocks and
flows. Stocks are groups classified on the basis of rele-
vant attribute (s)
,
(i.e., paygrade* . The numbers in such
categories will be called the stocks at that time, (the
scenario projections are made on a yearly basis) . By
denoting the number of catagories by (k) , the stock in cate-
gory (i) at time (t) will be writtsn n (T) and the set of
stocks as a row vector thus:
n(T) = (n (t), n (t) , n (t) .




Enlisted (1982) » E1-E3 (1982) + E9 (1982).
Force
The stock vector provides a snap shot of the
system but tells us nothing directly about change over time.
The stock picture must therefore be supplemented by the
numbers that have moved bat ween categories over an interval
of time. Consider an interval of time of unit length to be
from (T-1) to (T) , and denote the number of individuals
moving between categories (i) and (j) in this period by
N (T-1,T) .
Flows are those changes in the paygrades
resulting from promotion, attrition (i.e., non-reenlistment,
retiring) and recruitment. It is important to observe that
flows relate to an interval and not a point in time, as is
the case with stocks. (Those who stay in the same category
are also counted as flows.)
In practice many of the cells will have zero
entries, because the Army enlists most people at the lower
paygrade E1-E4 levels and except for a few lateral entries
or prior service, no one enters active duty above the
paygrade of E5. The flows listed in Table XX7 are internal
to the system and will be described as promotions or demo-
tions. In addition there is a two-way flow (entry/exit)
between the personnel system and the "outside (private)
world". The attrition flow from category (i) in the
interval (T-1,T) will be denoted by N (T-1) and the
vector of attrition flows by n (T-1). The recruitment
flow into category (i) in the same interval is n (T) with
the corresponding vector n (T) . Notice in the latter case
the departure from the convention of identifying the time
interval by its starting point (T-1) and the use of the end
point (T) instead. This is because recruitment is thought




MANPOWER ACCOUNTS FOR THE INTERVAL (T-1,T).
RECRUITS | ATTRITION | BEGINNING
















n (T-1) ,. ...n (T-1) | n (T-1) | n (T-1)
n (T) , n (T) , n ( T)
Column Totals
Notes: n = stogie values, T time (present),
T-1 = time (last, time) , n = recruits,
n = flows between categories,
n = attrition from a category,
n (T-1) - beginning strengths of the
categories, k- (1,2,...k).
Source: Bartholomew, D.J. and Forbes, A. A.
,
Statistical Techniques for Manpower Planning,
7irey7~T97?.
Flows can be classified according to whether the
impetus for a move lies at the starting point or at its
destination. Thus an individual moves into a higher grade
because it was necessary to fill a vacancy arising at that
level. Think of that person as being pulled into the higher
grade. If, on the other hand, the move to the higher grade
is automatic as a result of acquiring a new qualification,
the move takes place because of an event occuring at the
point of origin. Such flows are called "push" flows.
The distinction between "push" and "pull" flows
is often not as clear-cut as the example may suggest. For
instance, there can be both a push and a pull element
involved in a move when a vacancy arises which can only be
filled by a suitably qualified person. Attrition will
always be treated as a push flow. Promotion, transfer and
recruitment can be treated in either way according to the
type of system being modeled [Ref. 27].
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Sometimes it is more informative to express the
flows as proportions. For example, the recruit, stock and
flow elements, in Figure U. 1, are set out in a table of
manpower accounts in Table XVI. The row and column totals
give the stocks at the end- points of the interval. If the
Table elements are expressed as proportions of their row
total (see Table XVI, A) the flow rates out of each category
are obtained . For example, there are 100 E4's at the
beginning of the interval (T-1) . During the interval, 10
E4»s are promoted to E5, for a 10 percent flow out of E4
(10/beginning strength of 100). There are also 15 E4's that
leave the interval (T-1), for a 15 percent attrition rate
(15/ 100). And lastly, there are 75 E4«s that remained in
pay grade E4, for a flow rate of 75 percent (75/beginning
strength of 100). The other flow rates may be developed in
a similar manner. Such rates are a useful way of expressing
the pattern of flows and of identifying problem areas.
It is also useful, though less common, to
express the elements in the table as proportions of the
column totals, as is in Table XVI (B) This would be appro-
priate if there was interest in seeing the pattern of flows
into a given category, such as recruitment and promotion,
rather than the pattern of flows out.
In Figure *.1, stock and flow information is
developed as a three grade heirarchy, network flow diagram.
The military is also a heirarchy, because it promotes from
within and allows little or no lateral entry. The rectan-
gles in Figure 4.1 represent the paygrades E4 - E6 and the
numbers inside them are the stocks at the beginning of the
interval. The arrows represent the paths along which flows




TRANSITION MATRIX PLOi RATES
(IN PERCENT)










Note: the rows percentages sun to 1
(B) Flow Rates lata a Category







Note: the column percentages sui to 1.
Source: Adapted from Statistical Techniq ues for
Manpower Plana mq, ny""Harfh"oTom€w"*an3""
Fo fDesT" Wirey 7 ~T97 9
.
Table XXVII uses the information in Figure 4.1
to help explain the theoretical values that are expressed in
Table XXV. For example, the beginning strengths of E4's at
time (T-1) equal 100. Ten E4 • s are promoted, during the
interval, to E5 and 15 E4's attrite (failed/were not allowed
to reenlist) . At the end of the time interval (1-1), 25 SU's
are recruited. The total E4»s at time (T) is then equal to






















Note: An hierarchical system promotes from within
and allows no laxeral entrv.
Notice that oq ly paygrade El has recruits,
the E5 and E5 paygrades depend on the system
to supply personnel.
Source: Adapted from Bartholomew and Forbes,
Statistical Techniques far Manpower Planning,
7TIey7~T977.
Figure 4.1 HETIORK DIAGRAM FOR A THREE GRADE HIERARCHY
b. The Transitional Flow Moiel
The transitional flow model is a special Markov
Chain model which deals with heterogeneous (versus homoge-
neous) systems in which people are classified according to
such things as age, location and paygrade. The Baseline and
Unstable Accessions scenarios used in this thesis are
transitional flow models.
The following List of gjestions gives some idea
of the purposes which Markov Chain models may serve in a
practical manpower planning situation.
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Notes: This Table shows tie information as set
out in a flow pattern in the format of Fiqur e 4.1
Source: AdaDted from Bartholomew and Forbes
Statistical Techniques for Man power Planning,
1. What will the grade structure be at various dates in
the future if present patterns of loss and promotion
continue?
2. What should the promotion ratss and recruitment rates
be in order to achieve a desired structure in a
specified time?
3. What impact will expansion dt contraction of the
organization have on the promotion prospects of the
grade structure? What can be done to anticipate and
minimize the ill effects of such changes?
Table XXVIII shows the basic transitional flow
model. It states that the strength, at the end of an
interval of time (year) is a functiDn of the beginning year
strengths, transitional flow matrix, and the total




THE BASIC MANPOWER TRANSITIONAL FLOW MODEL
PERSONNEL
END STRENGTH INVENTORIES TRANSITIONAL TOTAL
AT THE END = AT THE X MATRIX ACCESSIONS
OF THE YEAR BEGINNING FOR THE
OF THE YEAR YEAR
Note: End Strengths = personnel inventories at the
beginning of the year multiplied by the
transition matrix plus the recruits
daring the year.
Personnel Inventories = beginning year strengths.
In example. Apdx.D/E shows the Army end strength
in 1981. Those end strengths plus tfie recruits
from 1981 will equal the beginning strengths for 1982,
Transition Matrix is developed from the proportions
of the promotion, retention and attrition flows, by
paygrade, during FY 1981.
Source: Adapted from Rand Note WD-5 1 5-MRASL,
Enlisted Supoly in the 1980's,
February 79TJU7
*• Alterna tive Supply/Demand Scenarios
a. Introduction
This section will discuss the Baseline and Unstable
Accession scenarios using output from the MANMOD program.
The Baseline and Unstable Accessions scenarios are developed
from the same beginning inventory and transition matrix.
However, they differ as to the number of enlistees they
access yearly. Appendix D gives the MANMOD inputs/outputs
for the Baseline scenario, and Appendix E gives the MANMOD
inputs/outputs for the Unstable Accession scenario.
b. Scenario Assumptions
Model assumptions are made in an effort to
isolate a specific "what if" situation by controlling varia-
bles (which are uncontrollable in real life) so -hat an
analysis of the situation can be aade. Therefore, the
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closer the assumptions are to the reality of a future situa-
tion, the more valid the results should be. In other words,
the assumptions provide the base frsa which the prediction
and conclusions are developed, as well as the range of their
accuracy. The following assumptions were used in developing
the supply/ demand scenarios. The scenarios (Baseline and
anstable Accessions) use the same basic assumptions with any
differences that exist being discussed in the results of the
given scenario. The assumptions are:
1. The 1981 stock values (paygrade strengths) are
accurate.
2. The transition matrix is accurate and will remain
constant thru 1990. This means that no changes are
anticipated in, for instance, attrition, retention,
promotion, or retirement rates.
3. Male AFQT category I ,11, and III accessions will be
available as predicted by the Fernandez (RAND) Model
(as shown in Table 711).
4. Female AFQT category I, II and III accessions will
continue to be available at the 17000 rate thru 1990.
(Note: This is assuming the limit of 65000 enlisted
women is held constant).
5. Prior service personnel will be accessed at higher
rates than the present service quotas allow. (Note:
This view is taken under the theory that they would
cost less to train and would be more likely to reen-
list (be careerists) than non-prior service
accessions.)
5. Non-prior service, mental category IV's accessions
will continue to be available in numbers greater than
the Congressional Policy will allow to enlist. (Note:




7. Civiiianization (civilian substitution) of military
jobs is an acceptable means of reducing force struc-
ture and cutting back on accession requirements.
(Note: In particular, the Contracting of Industrial
Type Activities (CIIA) may offer the possibility to
relieve the military from force requirements and
reduce the secondary labor costs that come with
permanent hire employees.)
8. Lateral Entry is a viable, accepted program in the
Army. (Note: Lateral entry into the military is
receiving more attention these days due to the intense
technical training required of the average G.I. The
question is, whether or not it is more cost effective
to train an enlistee or would it be better to hire
direct?)
9. Lastly, and importantly, the aggregate and paygrade
requirements listed in Appendix F are those necessary
to attain an 18 Division force. (Note: In reality it
is evident that a more technical force would also be a
more career intensivs force. However the Requirements
estimate maintains the same percentages as the
Authorized paygrades are in the 1981 Army Program
Objective Memorandum.)
5. Results (Baseline Scenario!
a. Aggregate Manning Capability of Baseline
This scenario grows the force over two separate
periods, FY82-86 and FY86-90. The methodology consists of
determining the growth requirements (found by subtracting
the beginning strengths from the anl strengths) and dividing
them over the intervening years. The figures in Table XXIX
indicate that, given the assumptions for the Baseline
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Scenario, all aggregate re quirements can be net in manning
an 18 division force by 1990- However, the number of AFQT
category IV accessions increase from 7,700 in 1982 to
21,900 in 1990. (The supply of NPS Sals AFQT I-IIIA acces-
sions was estimated using the Rand model. The results can be
found in Table VII.) To improve the quality of the force,
it may be necessary to accept more women, develop a compre-
hensive lateral entry program, and/or civilianize military
positions. Notice also that an important aspect of this
scenario is that prior service accessions are greater than
present service policy constraints allow. Without this
policy change the requirements could not have been met after
1983. (Note: prior service accessions equaled 19,900 in
1981, whereas in the scenario, they are doubled to equal
39,800 from 1983-1990.) The total force grows by 8 percent
by 1986 (17 divisions) and only 3 percent thru 1990 (18
divisions). These increases occur with The recruits never
exceeding 140,000. This gradual growth should cause fewer
problems for the recruit training, and personnel systems.
b. Paygrade Manning Capability Of Baseline
The paygrade strength changes should be observed
and compared on a yearly basis. Note in particular the
growth in the E5-27 paygrades from 1981-1986. The following
information describes the paygrade data in Table XXX and
depicts changes over the period FY 1982-86, when the force
expands to 17 divisions and increase by 40,800 soldiers.
You will observe that the paygrades in the Baseline scenario
are increased slowly and create very little turbulence in
the personnel system. The Unstable Accessions scenario is
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REQUIREMENTS 132.8 139.3 139.7
SUPPLY POOL
NPS Male Accessions
AFQT Category I, II, III
Women Accessions



















Note 1. accession requirements are based on the computer
run in Appendix D (Baseline) .
2. NPS Male accessions are based on the Rand Model
results listed in Table VII.
3. The other elements are based on the Scenario
assumptions.
4. NPS (Non-Prior Service)
5. AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test)
6. Using this scenario it was not necessary to
use the civilian substitution or lateral entry
supply pools.
Source: Author, using MANMOD data from Appendix D,
Rand Model data from Table VII, and the
scenario assumptions.
1. the number of 21*3 decrease and then gradually
increase again from 8 3 to 86,
2. the number of E2* s increase and then remain almost
constant through the period,
3. the number of E3's increase by 8500 quickly, and then
maintain a gradual growth rate of about 1000,
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4. the number of E4»s decrease in 82-83 and then maintain
a gradual growth pattern of about 1600,
5. the number of E5's increase quickly in the first year
and then settle down to a gradual growth rate of about
1500,
6. the numbers of E6*s grow at a rate of 3000 over FY
82-84 and then increase at a decreasing rate through
FY 1986,
7. the numbers of E7 ( s maintain almost constant growth of
about 2000 over the period,
8. the numbers of E8's grow at a nodest , but increasing
rate through FY 1985,
9- the numbers of E9 f s grow yearly in multiples of 15.
In summary, the growth patterns in each paygrade remain
constant over the years. In comparison, note the changes in
the FY 1985-86 Unstable Accessions data data over the same
period.
The following discussion describes the Baseline
scenario paygrade manning trends over the period from FY
1986-90, when the force grows to 18 divisions and increases
by 25,500 soldiers.
1. the numbers of El's decrease after the FY 86 growth
requirement, and then settle down to modest yearly
increases of about 600,
2. the numbers of £2*3 remain almost constant, with
slight growth at the end of the period,
3. the numbers of E3*s have a lot of variance during this
period,
4. the numbers of E4»s taper off in their growth, and
continue to grow at a decreasing rate through 1990,




6. the number of E8's growth levels off at 522 yearly,
7. the numbers of E9's continue to maintain modest yearly
growth increases.
In summary, the Baseline paygrades maintain
reasonable (no large variances) growth patterns that should
be maintainable beyond 1990.
6. Results I Unstable Accessions Scenario)
a. Aggregate Manning Capability of Unstable
Accessions
This scenario uses the same inputs as the
Baseline scenario, except that it attempts to provide the
accessions as they are required. The result is that yearly
force increases vary by large amounts and so do the number
of accessions. This kind of systam variance would cause
undue stress on the recruit, training and personnel systems,
not only during the requirement year but also in the future.
However, the accession requirements shown ia Appendix F
should be within the capabilities 3f the Army recruiters,
except in FY 1986. In that year there is a projected
increase of 34,900. This total fores increase would require
an increase in accessions of 27,900 over the previous year.
The result is a shortage of 10,700. This equals a total
force growth of 6 percent in one year. Note the "bubble" of
accessions as they move thru the system, especially in the
grades of E6 and E7 . The model nanages to make up the
difference by 1990, so a temporary solution would have to be




increase retention rates through bonuses, other
incentives,




PAYGRADE MANNING TRENDS 0? BASELINE
17 DIVISIONS
PAYGRADE STRENGTH CHANGES
FY 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86
E1 -1064 412 + 1 040 + 1144
E2 1853 198 + 219 + 277
E3 8121 + 1567 + 841 + 1098
E4 -8349 1343 + 1811 + 1656
E5 4481 + 1317 + 1248 + 1293
E6 + 2922 +3006 +2569 + 2217
E7 1933 + 1972 + 2017 + 1994
E8 287 + 357 + 413 + 458
E9 15 + 29 43 + 60
18 DIVISIONS
PAYGRADE STRENGTH CHANGES
FY 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90
E1 -1414 + 494 + 645 + 643
E2 - 49 - 43 121 + 156
E3 + 687 - 559 + 316 + 610
E4 + 1474 + 1 121 + 319 + 501
E5 + 1245 + 1 199 + 1071 + 819
E6 + 1947 + 1728 + 1550 + 1387
37 + 1929 + 1 841 + 1739 + 1633
E8 + 491 + 513 + 522 + 522
E9 + 73 + 88 + 99 + 1 10
Note: (1) The data was developed by subtracting
the previous years paygrada strength
from the present years paygrade strength,
(2) + = increase, - = decrease.
Source: MANMOD data from Appendix D.
3. access more women,
4. "use " the lateral entry program,
5. use the Contracting of Industrial Type Activities
(C.I.T. A. ) program.















REQUIREMENTS 131. 1 159.0 140.0
SUPPLY POOL
NPS Male Accessions AFQT
Category I, II, III
Women Accessions AFQT
Category I, II, III
Prior Service Accessions


















Note 1. Accession requirements are based on the computer
run in Appendix E (Trouble)
.
2. NPS Male accessions are based on the Rand Model
results listed in Table VII.
3. The other elements are based on the Scenario
assumptions.
4. NPS (Non-Prior Service)
5. AFQT (Armed Foroes Qualification Test)
6. Using this scenario it was necessary to
use the civilian substitution or lateral entry
supply pools.
Source: Author, using MANMOD data from Appendix E,
Rand Model data from Table VII, and the
scenario assumptions.
b. Paygrade Manning Capability of Unstable
Accessions
The following discussion will describe the data
from Table XXXII. The period to be discussed will include
FY 1982-86, in which the Army grows from 16 to 17 divisions
and increases by 40,800 soldiers. The Unstable Accession
scenario differs slightly from the Baseline in the way its
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recruit proportions are developed. The proportion is
adjusted only once for the prior service entrants, whereas,
the Baseline scenario is adjusted twice (see Appendices D
and E) . The resulting paygrade trends are:
1. the numbers of E1's initially grow at a decreasing
rate, but end with an increase of 1513 in the FY 85-86
time frame,
2. the numbers of 22 f s vary throughout the period, and
also end with a growth of 2839 in the FY 85-86 time
frame,
3. the numbers of E3's vary greatly, from +6000 to a
-1200 to +1200 and increase again to +6000,
4. the numbers of E4* s decrease at a decreasing rate
until FY 85-86, when they increase by 1513,
5. the numbers of E5's decrease yearly from FY 83-86 at a
rate of approximately 600,
6. the numbers of E6's increase, but at a decreasing rate
through FY 86,
7. the numbers of E7 1 s maintain an almost constant growth
of approximately 2000 over the period,
8. the numbers of E8's and E9's grow in modest amounts
over the period.
In summary, the lower paygrades (E1-E5) are in a constant
state of change throughout the period. While the upper
grades maintain modest growth rates, some in decreasing
amounts.
This paragraph will discuss the data in Table
XXXII for the period FY 19 87-90, in which the Army grows
from 17 to 18 divisions and increases by 25,500 soldiers.
The paygrade trends are:
1. the number of E1's begin tha period with a large
decrease and then grow at a decreasing rate until 1989
when they begin to decrease again,
10U

2. the numbers of S2's decrease to almost 1000 in 1988
but increase slowly until 1990 when they grow
slightly,
3. the number of S3»s vary greatly over the period, from
+11666 to -6641, and finally finish the period with a
growth of 964,
4. the number of £4*3 grow in large amounts for the first
two years, but then grow at a decreasing amount at the
end of the period,
5. the number of E5*s grow at a steep rate through 1989
and then drop off in 1990,
6. the numbers of E6's grow at a decreasing rate through
1989 and increase in 1990,
7. the numbers of E7's and E8's grow at a decreasing rate
throughout the period,
8. the numbers of E9's maintain a constant, but modest
growth throughout the period.
In summary, the lower paygrades are in a constant state of
flux, while the upper paygrades either decrease or maintain
a constant growth pattern.
c Aggregate Comparisons of Baseline and Unstable
Accessions
A comparison of the 3aseline and Unstable
Accession scenarios consists of a discussion based on Table
XXXIII. During this discussion, consider that the main
difference between the two scenarios is the manner in which
they "grow". The Unstable Accessions scenario grows to meet
the next year's requirements. Baseline, on the other hand,
"grows" the force in two stages, PY 1982-86 and FY 1986-90.
The Baseline methodology consists of averaging the differ-
ences between the beginning years and averaging the




PAYGRADE MANNING TRENDS OF (INSTABLE ACCESSIONS
17 DIVISIONS
PAYGRADE STRENGTH CHANGES
FY 82-83 83-84 84-85 35-86
E1 + 4535 + 1114 + 4588 + 21 119
E2 + 701 - 153 + 573 + 2809
E3 6507 -1148 + 1028 + 6272
E4 -13066 -247 1 -1614 + 1513
E5 + 3339 - 523 - 854 + 691
E6 2846 + 2754 + 2070 + 1488
E7 + 1910 + 1944 + 1959 + 1881
E8 285 + 35 4 + 408 + 451
E9 + 15 + 29 + 43 + 59
18 DIVISIONS
PAYGRADE STRENGTH CHANGES
FY 86-87 87-8 8 88-89 39-90
E1 -16488 + 2081 + 1749 - 811
E2 + 300 - 971 - 226 + 79
E3 +1166 6 -664 1 + 5 + 964
E4 + 5465 +8984 + 402 + 352
E5 - 187 + 1302 + 2792 + 1966
E6 + 1050 + 80 4 + 851 + 1 120
E7 + 1741 + 1567 + 1393 + 1256
E8 + 47 8 + 48 9 + 484 + 469
E9 + 73 + 86 + 97 < 105
Note: The data were developed by subtracting
the previous years paygrade strength
from the present ysar 1 s paygrade strength,
+ = increase, - = decrease in strength.
Source: MANMOD data from Appendix E.
the Baseline trends are constant, while the Unstable
Accession scenario trends are varying and turbulent. Notice
in particular the "growth" differentials (differences
between the scenarios) in Table XXXIII. In 1984, Baseline
has grown five percent and developed a growth differential
of 22,000 over the Unstable Accession scenario. However, the
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growth differential changes by FY 1986, as the Unstable
Accessions scenario increased its force by seven percent and
43, 100 in two years, in order to meet the FY 1986 aggregate
requirement of 726,700. Both scenarios made the aggregate
goal for FY 1986, allowing the increase to 17 divisions.
The Baseline scenario again develops a growth
differential (1800) in FY 1987, and maintains a small one
(500) in FY 1988. However, in FY 1989, Baseline had its
first significant shortage (1200). But, by FY 1990, the
shortage is reduced to 300. Both scenarios met the goal
requirements for the FY 1982-86 time period, but the
Baseline scenario had a shortage in FY 1989. However, the
Baseline scenario provided the best planned growth pattern
of the two scenarios. The Unstable Accessions scenario
"grew" the force yearly by "leaps and bounds" and was able
to meet all required aggregate strength requirements.
d. Paygrade Percentage Comparisons of Baseline
and Unstable Accessions
A comparison of the paygrade percentage supply
will consist of a discussion of the data in Table XXXIV.
The table contains the paygrade percentages of the Baseline,
Unstable Accessions, and the "goal" requirements, for FY
1982,86 and 90. It should be noted that there is a differ-
ence in the way the scenarios are developed which would have
an impact on this comparison. The difference is that the
Unstable Accession scenario did not have the second recruit
proportion adjustment (see Appendices D , FY 1983). This
difference could impact on the fill rates of the Paygrades
E5- E7
.
In FY 1982, the Unstable Accession scenario is
closer to the "goal" requirements of paygrade E6 and 28,







































































- 0. 3 751.7
111 ?
Note:1. The Unstable Accession data
are equivalent (i.e., percentages
are based with T981 = 100S> .
2. Growth differentials
are the differences between the two
scenario strengths.
3. Baseline strengths are from
Appendix D; Unstable Accession
strengths are from Appendix E.
Source: Author
Baseline scenario is closer to the "goal" requirements of
all paygrades, except for E9.
In FY 1990, the Unstable Accessions scenario is
closer to the "goal" requirements of paygrades S7,E8, and
E9, and Baseline is closer to the "goal"requirements of
paygrades E1-E6. Over the period, from FY 1982-90, the
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Baseline scenario maintains d paygrads percentages closer to
the pay grade "goal" requirements than did the Unstable
Accessions scenario.
TABLE XXXIV



































































Note: 1. Baseline data were developed from Appendix D rUnstable Accessions data were developed from
Appendix E, and the Requirements data
was taken from Appendix F.
2. EXAMPLE: 33.39* by E1-E3 under FY82 (Baseline)
means that 33.3 9'* of the aggregate force are
expected to be E1-E3 in FY82 under that
scenario. The 27.7% under Requirements means
that 27.7* of the Army's enlisted billets
are presently E1-E3's and with growth are





It is paradoxical that during a time when the
traditionally used manpower pool is decreasing, that one of
the most challenging issues facing the Army in the 1980's is
how to cope with the biggest influx of weaponry and
equipment since World War II. The Amy's Force Modernization
Program is expected to have a profound effect in many major
areas, ranging from readiness to training methods, to unit
structure. These "tools of battle 11 are expected to touch
off a period of intensive change, perhaps the most sweeping
in the Army f s history . The ohanges will encompass
practically every activity connected with putting and
keeping a combat force in the field. New doctrine will have
to be developed to fully exploit the capabilities of the new
systems. Tactics, unit organization, missions, operations,
training— especially training . Training will undergo change
as the Army adjusts itself to the new "electronics age" of
weaponry.
" If human resources are the ultimate wealth of a
nation, so also are they its strength. All the
sophisticated weaponry in the world will not
compensate for a fighting force which is poorly
organized, deficiently motivated, ill-trained and
defectively deployed. In fact, the growing
complexitv of armaments and of military strategies
requires increasingly better trained and educated
manpower." [Ref. 33]
Given "stable" military requiremsnts, a recovery in the
civilian economy, and a smaller prime supply pool to meet
these needs, labor will become an increasingly expensive
resource for the military. As labor becomes a more valuable




Manpower planning is a leans of orovidina early ^'a.~'". r
of such problems, provided that the assumptions upon which
it is based are sound. Even if assumptions are not always
correct (as is inevitable, particularly on the demand side)
the existence of the data makes it easier to assess the
effect of sudden changes and even to influence decisions by
showing in advance the manpower implications. Planning of
this kind shows the implications of current recruitment
policies or retirement and attrition levels.
By using the APL prediction model, MANMOD, aggregate and
pay grade projections were made about the feasibility of
manning 18 Army Divisions by 1990. The resultant predictions
indicate that the Army could meet the aggregate manning
requirements by 1990. In accomplishing this, the total
accession requirements could remain less than 140,000 and
still allow for the required eight percent growth by 1986
and a total growth of eleven percent by 1990. However, the
paygrade predictions fall short of the ideal requirements
(as listed in Appendix F) . The shortages are as follows:
1. the number of E9's is slightly under requirements by
(.3%) ,
2. the number of E8*s is over requirements by (.7*),
3. the number of E7's is over requirements by (.633),
4. the number of E6 f s is (13) short of requirements,
5. the number of E5*s is (13) short of requirements,
6. the number of E4's is short of requirements by (43)
,
7. while the number of E1-E3's is over requirements by
(5 3) •
The implications involved with the lower paygrades,
although large in actual numbers, are not totally disast-
rous. The Army manning policy allows individuals to fill
positions which are two grades higher, or one grade under
111

their present paygrade. Personnel who are -J1-£3*s can be
redistributed to meet the E4 and E5 requirements and that
the overage in E7's can be used to fill the shortage in the
E6 requirements. This means that the aggregate numbers are
adequate, but not necessarily optimal. That is to say r it
is a solution, but not the only solution. Through manipula-
tion of paygrade policy, the combination of paygrades from
either scenario would meet the paygrade requirements.
The author considers the Baseline scenario to be the
better of the two considered, in that it allows the force
structure to expand more gradually over time. That means
that training programs, recruiter efforts and personnel
policy will not be stretched or expanded to the extremes in
meeting aggregate force requirements.
Issues not shown directly by the models but alluded to
in Chapter III still require Army attention. The Army is
involved in a large-scale modernization program as a result
of extensive research and development initiated in the early
1970* s. Therefore, the numbers of high quality personnel
required to operate and maintain these advanced systems is
estimated to increase. Available recruits will probably
continue to reflect the declining efficiency of the present
educational system. Additionally, it will be necessary to
increase the accession rate of category IV recruits to main-
tain recruit quantity, due to the decline of the recruit
source pool. Therefore, the Army must continue to estimate
its target population's capabilities, compare them with the
demand requirements and assess the implications to the Army
Battle-field Development Plan. In some cases remedial
training or longer training times may be able to produce the
basic skills required to perform Army jobs. In other cases,
the equipment may have to be modified. The Army leadership




Throughout: the Army there is in increasir.g awareness
that the past worry of equipping the man is being replaced
with the worry of manning the eguipment and the realization
that manpower is a resource which requires efficient manage-
ment and utilization. Winston Churchill summed up the task
when he said,
" It is no use saying, 'We are doing our best.'
You have got to succeed in doing what is neces-




ARMY MOS C ATS GO HI Z AT ION EXAMPLES
The following Figures hold examples of the
categorization process used in Chapter III, as written by
the study group at the National Defense University (1980).
The study team was attempting to establish trends in MOS
growth as a result of tae modernization program that the
Army is implementing. The procedure is described in Chapter
III Section B,3.
The categorization process used established three
ranges, low, mid and high as referring to the entrance
qualifications for a given Army MOS.
MOS Description Min. Entry points
Qualifications
















MOS DESCRIPTION MIN. ENTR7.
QUALIFICATIONS points
91 S Environmental
Health Spec, Phy. Profile 2222211 1
Aptitude: ST 100
'skilled technical 100).. 1
.olor Perception
Normal) 2
IS AlgeDra Read 2
HS Chemistry Read 3




Figure A. 2 MID LEVEL, MOS CATEGORY (EXAMPLE)
MOS DESCRIPTION MIN. ENTR?
QUALIFICATIONS points
98C Electronic Phy. Profile 2222212 1
Warfare Signal Aptitude: ASVA3 SCORE






Plus SI Required 4
OS Citizenship Reqd 1
TOTAL 13




ARMY MOS CATS3 0RIZATI0N PROCEDURES
The purpose of this appendix is to categorize the Army
MOS * s into technical categories based upon AFQT scores. The
basic information was obtained from a member of the Military
Manpower Task Force in January 1982. Their measure for the
categorization was the AFQT score. The AFQT score is
computed by adding the arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge,
paragraph comprehension and half of numerical operations
test scores from the ASVAB.
TABLE XXXV
ASVAB SERIES 3, 9, AND 10 SUBTESTS
TEST ACRONYM
1. Numerical Operations NO
2. Coding Speed CS
3. Word Knowledge WK
4. Arithmetic Reasoning AR
5. Paragraph Comprehension PC
6. Math Knowledge MK
7. Electronics Information EI
8. Mechanical Comprehension MC
9. General Science 3S




The aptitude areas are based on combinations of ASVA3
subtests. The standard scores for aptitude areas are normed
similar to IQ tests, with a score of 100 as the average, and




ARMY APTITUDE AREAS, ASVAB 9, 9, and 10
Aptitude Area Subtests
CO (Combat) CS+AR+MC+AS






GM (General Maint.) MK+EI+GS+AS
MM (Mechanical Maint) NO+EI+MC + AS
CL (Clerical) NO+CS+VE
ST (Skilled Technical) VE+MK+MC*GS
GT _(General Technical) 7E + A3
Source: TRADOC Report ACN 64024,
Soldier Capability— Arm£ Combat
ffTtectlveness 75CA"£|J"7
5y J. Toomepuu, Spril 193 1.
subtests, a verbal score (VE) , uade up by adding Word
Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension subtest scores, is
used to compute aptitude area scores. The subtests are
listed in Table XXXV, and aptitude area composites in Table
XXXVI.
Tables XXXVII-XLI delineate the categorization of the




SEMI-TECHNICAL MOS'S (AFQT SCORE =75-90)
00J, 00Y, 00Z, 03C, 05B, 11B.C,H t M, 12B.C.F, 13B,16B,D,F.P,R,S, 19D,E,K,Z, 26D, 35B, 36C,D,E,K, 41C,J,
43E,M. 44B 453, T, 513,C,K,M,N,
54E, 55B, 57F,H,61B,F, 62B, E r F, G, H, J, N,63B,H,J,W, 64C.Z, 65G,
68m' ^2E,G c H, 76V, W,X, 8^C,
82E, 83F, 84C,94B, 95C, 96C.
Source: Basic Data obtained froi the Military
Manpower Task Force and adapted by the
Author using DA Circular 6 11-81-4,
dated 12 Feomary 1982.
TABLE XXXVIII
TECHNICAL MOS'S (AFQT SCDRE = 91-99)
00B r E f 02B,C,D,E.F,G, H,J,K, L,M, N,P,Q,R,S,T,Z, 05C,D,G,H,K,
12E,Z, 13C,E # Y, 15D,E, 16C, E,G, H r J, T, Z r 17C,K,L,M, 21G,L,
22L,N, 23N,U,W, 24H.J,K,L, 25J-L, 25 3 ,C. H,Q,
R
t T, V,27B,C,D,E,F,G,H,N, 31M £ N,V,Z, 32D,H,S, 33S, 34B,Y,35C,E,F,K, 41B,E.G, 42C,D,E. 44E, 45D # E .G, K, L, N. Z , 46N,
51G,H,P,R,T,Z, 52C,D C E,G, 53B, 54C,Z, 55G,X. 63E.N,65B,D,E,F,H,J,K.Z, 68J, 7 1C.G ,L, M,
N
r P, 73C, 7&3, 753, C,E,
76C,J,P,Y,Z, 79D, 81B,Z, 32B,C,D, 84B,F,T,Z,
91B,C,D,E,F,H.J,L,N,Q,S,T,U,V,W,Y, 92B,C,D,E, 93E,F, 94F,
963,0^^ 98G.
Source: Basic Data Obtained from the Military Manpower
Tas)c Force and adapted by the
Author using DA Circular 611-81-4,




OS ARMY SENIOR RATINGS (SKILL ENrR5T LEVEL, 2 OR HIGHER)
(Semi-tech) 00J,O",Z, 19Z 62N, 6*Z,
(Technical) 00E, 02P,Q,R,Z, 12Z, 13Y, 16Z, 23W, 31Z. 45Z,
51P,T,Z, 52E, 5UZJ 55X, 6$Z 75z, 79D,
81Z, 84T,Z, 96Z.
(High-Tech) 13W,Z, 24R,7. 27Z. 32Z, 34C,S . F.H, J. K,Z,
35P^aJ 55Z, 6lZ, S3Z, §7W,Z, &8K, 71E,Z,
74Z, 75Z, 95D.
(Non-occupational) -~00D r 09D, KrS,T, W.
Source: Author using DA Circular 6 11-81-4,




ilOS'S REQUIRING HIGH ELECTRICAL APTITQDE
24C,E,G,H,N,P,Q,U 26E,K 31E,J,S,T 32F 34E,F,H
35G,H 36L _7 1Q,R 73D_ 9 1 G_ 97B,C 98C,J
Note: This Table was dsveloped because of the
extensive growth of electrsriics within
the Army.




DIRECTIONS ?0 R THE USE OF MANMOD
This appendix describes and gives an example for using
the APL workspace as is required for Sanmod. This workspace
is used to solve the basic: transition equation described in
Sta tistical T echn iques for Manpower Planning, by Bartholomew
an Forbes-
After the Manmod program is copied onto your A disk, the
following steps are required to accomplish a computer run.
EXAHPLE: Baseline Scenario
Note: "quotation marks" designate those words that the
operator must type in.
STEP 1.
Find a terminal with the APL operands. Then log on in the normal
manner. Next type "APL", press enter; then press the alt key and
the APL on/off key simultaneously. Then type the following:
") LOAD MANMOD" /then wait;
SAVED 13:28:52 03/05/82
WSSIZE IS 414812 / then type;
") copy 2 apf ns cms "
"cms " /wait;
CMS SDBSET
BEGIN RECORDING OF TERMINAL SESSION








"INPUT" /This opens the program for input data;
ENTER N (INITIAL CLASS VALUES) :
This will be the initial stocks (numbers) of individuals
that are in each year group selected for study. It is
implicit that time is discrete and in practice will normally
equal one year.
/enter the stocks making sure the numbers are correct.
"67193 51664 116942 175794 121322 77941 U7167 13319 3745"
STEP 3
ENTER P (TRANSITION MATRIX) BY ROWS:
This is called the transition aatrix and each row is
called the position vector. It is implicit that these
specifications are time discrete and are usually in year
units. The elements of the vector will be assigned numerical
values by making hypothetical assumptions or by estimating
the probabilities from past data. The program requires one
row for each stock value listed above. The main diagonal
shows the percentage of individuals remaining in a year
group. To the left of the main diagonal would be percentages
designating those people that were demoted or lateral entry.
On the right side of the diagonal would be percentages
designating promotion rates.
/Enter your rows, insuring the numbers are correct.
ENTER 1TH ROW
.0572 .0937 .574 .0573 .0004
ENTER 2TH ROW
.0256 .0686 .406 .304 .0016 D
ENTER 3TH ROW




.0036 .0034 .0184 .493 .222 .3013
ENTER 5TH ROW
.0009 .0003 .0011 .0131 .673 .162
ENTER 6TH ROW
.0003 .0001 .0007 .0069 .782 .132
ENTER 7TH ROW
.0001 .0001 .0002 .0007 .821 .071
ENTER 8TH ROW
.0001 .0002 .764 .0593
ENTER 9TH ROW 00 00 0. 79
STEP 4
ENTER NUMBER OF RECRUIT TYPE
1 FIXED RECRUIT VECTOR
2 ADDITIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
3 MULTIPLICATIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
4 ADDITIVE (SYSTEM SIZE)
5 MULTIPLICATIVE(SYSTEM SIZE)
This gives the operator the chance to choose various
types of recruitment systsons. This thesis uses types 3, 4.
For further information on this capability obtain a copy of
Bartholomew and Forbes, "Statistical Techniques for Manpower
Planning".



















ENTER RPROP (RECRUIT PROPORTION VECTOR)






"1.5" (150%) ; " 1.2" ( 120?)
sk 1
note:
For further information usa Bartholomew and Forbes as mentioned above,




1 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENT OF TOTAL GRADE SIZE
2 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENT OF ORIGINAL GRADE SIZE
The percentage calculation usually requested is #1. This






DO IOU WISH TO SEE INTERVENING YEARS
NO
1 YES
If #1 is chosen and it is desirad to produce a program
that is calculated for 100 years, than the program will show
the figures for thru 100. If #0 is chosen, then only year
0,1 and 100 will be shown,
/type your choice.
STEP 7
END OF INPUT PROGRAM
Now it is time to get some output. Decide how many years
of data that you desire to predict, and type "baseqn (x) ".
For example, if you desire a ten year look, type "baseqn
10". The program will not print mora than 999. Once a year
has been selected, one cannot select that year or any
preceding it until you hava typed "reset" and presed enter.
Note: Any of the variables may be changed following any run
of Baseqn by direct assignment using APL language. All





CMS SUBSET /then type;
"RECORD OFF" /wait,
END RECORDING OF TERMINAL SESSION
/the machine will also ask you what you desire to
name the file/ and will place a copy on your disk
125

EXAHPL2: of a file name is;
(baselina apl / or any FN PT under 8 characters sach)
.
For further reference concerning APL:
APL -ST AT : A Do-It-Yours5lf Guid§ to Computational Statistics




BASELINE SCENARIO COMPOTER RON
The following computer run was used to develop the
discussion of the results concerning the Baseline Scenario
as is reported in in Chapter 17. Note: refer to Appendix C
for guidance in reproducing this run.
The following Hanmod inputs were used:
(N) 67193 51664 116942 175794 121322 77941 47167 13319 3^45
(P)
.0572 .0937 .574 .0573 .00 04
.0256 .0686 .406 .304 .0016
.0119. .0185 .185 .598 .0156 .3003
.0036 .0034 .0184 .493 .222 .3013
.0009 .0003 .0011 .0131 .673 .162
.0003 .0001 .0007 .0069 .782 .132
.0001 .0001 .0002 .0007 .821 .071
.0001 .0002 .764 .0593
.79
(TYPE) (of recruitment)
4 (additive system size)







E 1 67193 { 10)







5 121322 | 18)
6 7794 1 | 12)
7 47167 | ' 7)
8 13319 |
: 2)
9 3745 { 1)









4 185872 [ 27)
5 124526 [ 18)
6 80982 [ 12)
7 49032 [ 7)
8 13522 ( 2)
9 3748 [ D
TOTAL 685397 [ 102) 132783
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RPROP .6776 .091 .1U27 .075 .0122 .3004 .0002

































1 100975 I: 14)
2 26316 |
i <o
3 111511 I: 16)




6 86910 [ 12)
7 52937 [ 3)
8 14166 [ 2)
9 3792 | D
TOTAL 705798 <


















8 14579 | [ 2)
9 3835 |
: 1)
TOTAL 715 997 |











5 132865 i[ 18)
6 91696 [ 13)
7 56 948 |
: 3)
8 15037 [ 2)
9 3895 [ D





1 101745 [ 14)









6 93643 |[ 13)







109) 1 3712 3
FY 1988




3 113578 ( 15)
4 184928 |
! 25)




7 60718 ( 8)
8 16041 { ' 2)
9 4056 |
: D










4 185247 [ 25)
5 136380 |: 18)
6 96921 [ 13)
7 62457 i[ 3)









2 26997 i[ <m
3 114504 | [ 15)
4 185748 ( 25)
5 137199 [ 18)
6 98308 ( 13)
7 64 090 [ 9)
8 17085 ( 2)
9 4265
( 1)




UNSTABLE ACCESSIONS SCENARIO COMPUTER SON
The following computer run was used to develop the
discussion of the Re qui ram en ts Scenarios as is reported in
Chapter IV. Note: refer to Appendix c for guidance to
reproduce this run.
The following inputs were used:
(N)
67193 51664 116942 175794 121322 77941 47 167 13319 3745
(P)
.0572 .0937 .574 .0573 .0004
.0256 .06 86 .406 .3 04 .0016
.0119 .0185 .185 .598 .0156 .0003
.0036 .00 34 .0184 .493 .2 22 .0013
.0009 • 0003 .0011 .0 131 .673 . 162
.0003 .0001 .0007 .0069 .782 .132
.0001 .0001 .0002 .0007 .821 .071














2 51664 ( 9)
3 116942 t[ 17)
4 175794 [ 26)
5 121322 ( 18)
6 77941 [ 12)
7 47167 [ 7)
8 13319 [ 2)
9 3745 [ 1)
TOTAL 675087 ( 100) 8600
RPROP-.7101 .0875 . 1
FY 1982
I304 .0614 .01
1 105 24 ( 15)
2 23577 [ 3)
3 99763 [ 15)
4 183669 ( 27)
5 124181 ( 18)
6 80981 [ 12)
7 49006 ( 7)
8 13522 ( 2)
9 3748 ( D







2 24 276 i[ <*)
3 106270 ( 16)
4 170603 |
: 25)




7 50916 [ 7)
8 13807 l[ 2)
9 3763 [ D









4 168132 [ 25)
5 126997 [ 19)
6 86 581 ( 13)
7 52 86 |[ 8)
8 14161 [ 2)
9 3792
[ 1)





1 106407 ( 15)
2 24696 ( <0
3 106150 [ 15)
4 166518 ( 24)
5 126143 [ 18)
6 88651 I : 13)
7 54819 {[ 8)
8 14569 [ 2)












4 168031 | ' 23)
5 125 45 2 |' 17)




8 15020 < 2)
9 3894 |
: D





1 111038 ( 15)
2 27805 | : »)
3 124088 | I 17)
4 173496 | : 24)
5 125265 ( : 17)
6 91189 | : 12)
7 58441 ( : 3)
8 15498 |[ 2)
9 3967 | D





2 26834 |[ <o
3 117447 [ 16)
4 182480 | : 25)
5 126567 [ 17)
6 91993 [ 12)
7 60008 [ 9)
8 15987 i[ 2)
9 4053 <[ D





























1 114057 [ 15)
2 27 139
[ <*)
3 118416 [ 16)
4 183234 [ 24)
5 131325 |[ 17)
6 93964 [ 12)
7 62657
[ 9)








ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED REQUIREMENTS (FY 1982 z1990)
The following Table was developed to show the active
duty Enlisted requirements scenario for an Army of 18





ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED REQUIREMENTS (FY 1982-1990)
# Divisions 16 16 16 16
FY 1982 1983 1934 1985















189. 4 188.8 189.4 191.6
198. 3 197.7 198.2 200.6
131. 3 130. 9 131.3 132.3
91. 6 91.3 91.6 92.7
54. 53.9 54.0 54.7
15. 15.0 15.0 15.2
4. 1 4. 1 4. 1 4. 2
TOTAL (100.0) 683. 7 681.7 683.6 691.8
# Divisions 17
1986










201.3 202.4 204.6 206.8 208.3




139.5 140.3 141.8 143.3 144.4
E6 | 97.4 97.9 99.0 100.0 100.3
E7 | 7.9
I
57.4 57.7 58.3 59.0 59.4
E8 ( 2.2' I 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.4 16.5
E9 |
: -6 I 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5
TOT (100.0) 726.7 730.8 738.5 746. 5 752.0
Note: the percentage rates
fiscal years.
are heid constant across
Source: The data for FY 1982-1987 came from the Arm
Program Objective Memorandum (1983). FY 198














































7 INPUT iliXi PI 1ERRMSG
BRRMSG-' SRRORx DIMENSION NOT COMPATIBLE WITH N -VECTOR
TRY AGAIN I '
I-l
""""
* ENTER NilNITIAL CLASS VALUES)'
N-.U
K-pN




















-( TYPE*! ) /RPROPBNTRY











CBSCKl : -( ( TYPE ->*) ^TYPE'S ) /CHECK2

















































GRADE SIZE AS PERCENT OP










C 1 3 i-o
[23 -»{TCOUNT>Q) /CHECK
[33 SBTUP-.PPORM+-' .ace. I*. una*
[•3 PIRSTLINE-'I2,XZ t I2 t X t I$,X'
[53 FIRSTLINEl 2-PIRSTLINE , PPORM
[63 MIDLINE"-' XQ,I2 t X.I'B t X'
[7 3 MIDLINE12+-MIDLINE t PPORM
[83 LASTLINE-'X±,fiTOTALiH.I$ t X'
[93 LASTLINE-LASTLINE % PFORM ,' .IS'
[10] » T N PERCENT R'
[U3 i»»»< 3s8»: 38 < 8s:8 , S3»»,».:>




[16 3 PIRSTO-.PIRSTLINE LFMT TCOUNT ,J .Nil]
[17] -C0L0UTQ





[23] PIRST\2:PIRSTLINE12 bPMT TCOUNT .1 ,NLH .PERCENTlI]
[24] -C0L0UT12
[25] MID12:MIDLINE\2 IPMT I .Nlll .PERCENTtl']
[26] -C0L0UT12



















[1*3 START: HINT-H+ . *P
C153 TCOUNT-TCOUNT+l
[16 3 RECRUIT TCOUffT




C213 0£/rP£/rD>!2\4:r02\4£H (0. S+0NE+.*tt)
C223 TOTPERCERT-li 0.5*1 00 *r02ML Z?J7 r£2M£)
[23 3 tfStf#-l( 0.5 <?//£.*;?)














[ 2 3 *<-£
[3 3 RPROP-RPROP
[»»] TYPE-TYPE^
[ S 3 P*P






C 13 *(TJ?ff= 12 3 4 5) /OUT .ADDREC t MULTREC .ADDSIS ,MULTSTS






C 8 ] ADDS1S : R-(I!/C +T0TAL-SINT+ . *0i7£ ) *RPR0P
[9] -0
CIO] MULTSIS:R-U(PACT-1)*T0TAL)+T0TAL-RIST+.*0NE)*RPR0P
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